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3.1  Harmonization of Income Security? 
Many  aspects of  Canadian  economic policy, particularly  in the taxation 
arena, can be viewed as imitating policy developments in the United States. 
Yet this has not been the case with respect to most income security policies in 
Canada,  including  those  delivered  through  the  tax  system.  Canadian  and 
American  income  security  policies  have evolved  in  substantially  different 
ways over the course of this century. There has been surprisingly little imita- 
tion beyond  the  implementation  of  unemployment  insurance  following the 
shared experience of  the Great  Depression.  For example,  the contributory 
Canada and Quebec Pension Plans were introduced only in 1966, more than 
thirty years after Social Security was implemented in the United States, and 
with quite different structures and goals. There are no Canadian counterparts 
to the American food stamp program or the earned-income  tax credit. Not 
only has there been little imitation by Canada of  U.S. income security poli- 
cies, but there is also comparatively limited knowledge in the United States 
about Canadian developments.  U.S. income security policy has drawn virtu- 
ally nothing from the Canadian experience. Canadian demogrant programs of 
Family Allowance and Old Age Security, as well as several types of personal 
tax credits and benefit clawbacks, have no close parallels in the United States. 
What accounts for the lack of harmonization of Canadian income security 
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policies with those in the United States?’ It contrasts strikingly with Canada’s 
imitation of the United States in many other areas of economic policy, includ- 
ing personal and corporate taxation, deregulation of  industry, and privatiza- 
tion of  public services. One could cite fundamental cultural and historical 
differences, such as the stronger and more recent British and continental Eu- 
ropean ties of  Canadians, both personal and intellectual. The two countries 
also differ in their constitutional allocation of responsibilities for the provision 
of income security within confederation. For example, the federal government 
in Canada has required constitutional amendments to pursue three of its major 
income security programs.* The United  States, in contrast, has never been 
impeded by  constitutional factors in its income security policies, though the 
income tax required an amendment. These varied factors are undoubtedly im- 
portant. One might also consider that the economic pressures are less for Can- 
ada to conform to U.S.  policies in the income security field than for other 
areas that are more directly affected by competitive forces. 
3.1.1  Economic Reasons for Nonconvergence 
It remains to be explained why there are no strong competitive pressures for 
Canada to imitate the income security policies of the larger neighboring U.S. 
economy. Such pressures might operate through any of  three possible chan- 
nels: 1) the tax burdens needed to finance income security and the associated 
pressures on business costs; 2) the incentives for international migration from 
a heavy tax burden and an attractive income security regime; and 3) the impact 
of income security provisions on the operations or costs of particular markets 
or industries. We  shall examine each of these three possible channels of influ- 
ence to see why they have not posed major constraints on Canadian income 
security policies. 
First, there is the cost of financing income security programs and the result- 
ing tax pressures on Canadian businesses competing with American firms in 
overlapping markets. The total cost of  government is relevant here, not the 
cost of income security provisions alone. Canada has more budgetary leeway 
than the United States because of  its lesser share of national income spent on 
defense.  However,  this  surplus  is  more  than  consumed  on  a  variety  of 
uniquely Canadian concerns: the transport and communication costs of  run- 
ning a large, sparsely populated country, bilingualism and other cultural con- 
1. For income security, the term “harmonization” could refer to either the total scale of such 
programs or their structure. Given the much larger relative size of unemployment insurance and 
public health insurance in Canada than the US.,  it is clear that income security has not been 
harmonized in  the sense of  total scale. The present  study focuses on the structure of  income 
security, and it is found that neither the expenditure programs nor the tax-based provisions of the 
two countries have been harmonized. 
2. The affected programs were unemployment insurance,  Old Age Security, and the Canada 
Pension  Plan.  These constitutional  barriers  arose  because  the  programs  were  contributory- 
financed (OAS was initially financed by earmarked taxes). The federal government is much less 
constrained in providing income security through general-revenue financed programs, provisions 
in the tax system, and federal cost-sharing of provincial programs. See Blomqvist (1985). 99  Income Security via the Tax System 
cerns, and regional objectives. Health care and hospitals are almost fully in 
the public sector in Canada, but this also relieves businesses from the cost of 
providing private medical ins~rance.~  Canada has less extensive urban poverty 
than the United States and enjoys greater equality in  the pretax, pretransfer 
distribution of  income^.^ Hence Canada has less need for income security pro- 
visions, even if Canadian social values might tend to promote more adequate 
income security. A country can pursue more ambitious distributional or other 
social goals through programs financed by taxes that reduce real net incomes, 
rather than inflate export costs. Even if  some of  the incremental tax burden 
were to fall upon export costs, flexibility of exchange rates should compensate 
for any competitive disadvantages. 
Second, there is the possible flow of migrants into Canada, from the United 
States or elsewhere, if  income security becomes relatively attractive on the 
Canadian side of the border. Similarly, Canadian workers or business people 
may wish to emigrate if  they feel their tax burdens have become excessive. 
Migration flows have been a concern-regardless  of whether objectively war- 
ranted-in  the setting of Canadian personal income tax rates, or for that mat- 
ter all taxes impinging upon real after-tax incomes of Canadian workers. Be- 
cause of immigration barriers in each country, the most relevant workers are 
highly skilled, highly paid workers such as physicians and other profession- 
als, star athletes and public performers, and business entrepreneurs and upper 
managers. These groups might be induced to migrate based on relative tax 
burdens but are irrelevant for most income security issues. Even the Canada- 
U.S. free-trade agreement has eased mobility barriers for only a select list of 
professions and occupations. The primary beneficiaries of most income secu- 
rity programs-the  elderly and poorly paid, low-skilled persons-simply  do 
not qualify under the general classification for immigration to Canada. Under 
the  sponsored family-reunification classification, many  such  lesser-skilled 
persons may be admitted, but they are restricted from obtaining welfare pay- 
ments by the required sponsor’s guarantee of financial supp~rt.~  As a result of 
these institutional factors,  any migration-based pressures for harmonization 
of the general levels of income security between Canada and the United States 
have been quite limited to date.6 
Third, there are the possible effects of income security programs or similar 
3. This issue came up in the context of the free-trade debate of 1988, where critics claimed that 
free trade would place extreme pressure on Canada to abandon universal health coverage. Yet the 
total percentage of GDP devoted to health care costs is less for Canada than for the United States. 
4. For Canadian figures see Vaillancourt (1985a); for comparative Canadian-American analy- 
sis, see Hanratty and Blank (1992). 
5.  They are excluded from Social Assistance for a period of years, but they may still qualify for 
unemployment insurance after sufficient employment and for health insurance coverage after min- 
imal residence requirements set by the provinces. 
6. Hum (1988) and Boadway and Bruce (ch. 1 in this volume) agree with this general assess- 
ment. See Sinn (1990) and Gordon (ch. 2 in this volume) for an analysis of how perfect interna- 
tional mobility of labor could undermine the ability of  any country to pursue independent redis- 
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tax provisions upon economic behavior related to international competitive- 
ness. Some income security provisions might have an impact upon particular 
markets or industries in Canada in ways that either handicap them or favor 
them in their competition with businesses on the other side of the border. They 
may handicap an industry by  reducing the supply of  workers through rela- 
tively generous levels or terms of benefits. Or they may favor the industry by 
tying benefits to working in the industry, even if only sporadically or season- 
ally, such as the Canadian unemployment insurance provisions with respect to 
the fishing and forestry industries. Competitive pressures will tend to inhibit 
Canadian policy from pursuing the former types of policies too far. Political 
pressures, including GATT-based and free-trade-related litigation, may be in- 
voked when Canada pursues the latter types of  policies to extremes. These 
industry-specific provisions of income security are most commonly contained 
in unemployment insurance, workers’ compensation, training subsidies, and 
regionally directed grants to business, rather than in the income security pro- 
visions of the personal tax system. 
It  appears that  the  pressures for future harmonization of  Canadian  and 
American income security are limited  primarily  to  areas affecting specific 
markets or industries.’ Canadian policies are more likely to be constrained in 
this respect than are American policies. This follows both because of the rel- 
ative scale of the two countries’ markets and the greater power of the United 
States in situations of policy conflict. The most relevant programs are regional 
or  industry-oriented provisions  of  unemployment insurance and  possibly 
training offered in conjunction with income security. It could also apply to 
direct or subsidized employment programs having a particular impact on spe- 
cific markets or industries, although these are not a significant part of  the 
current policy  landscape. Harmonization pressures are much less likely to 
arise with respect to tax-based provisions, such as those aimed at relieving or 
supplementing low incomes or differentiating tax burdens by family size. Our 
study proceeds with a comparative description and analysis of income security 
in the two countries, with a special emphasis on provisions embodied in their 
tax systems. Perhaps greater familiarity will encourage policy makers in each 
country to adopt those elements of the other country’s income security system 
that are effective and would make sense in the home-country setting. 
3.1.2  Organization of the Study 
Our study first reviews the basic features of  income security provided in- 
dependently of the tax system, income security provisions of the personal tax 
system, and the interface between the tax system and independent transfer 
provisions. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 provide a broad-brush account of these insti- 
tutions for Canada and for the United States, with more detailed treatment of 
selected areas reserved for the later analysis. The main part of the study as- 
7.  See Hum (1988) for an earlier expression of this conclusion 101  Income Security via the Tax  System 
sesses and compares the income security features embodied in the two coun- 
tries’ personal tax systems. At lower incomes, our major interest is the ade- 
quacy of benefits and their incentive effects. Tax-relieving provisions are also 
relevant at lower incomes. At middle and higher incomes, our major interest 
lies in horizontal equity and incentive effects. Particular attention is given to 
provisions relating to family size and characteristics such as age, disability, 
and marital and dependency status. In addition to the labor market incentives 
that are paramount for the working poor, our analyses also touch on other 
incentives: aggregate savings and composition; notches and poverty traps; re- 
porting of income and evasion; timing and bunching of  income; and family 
formation and disintegration. 
The analyses are organized in  terms of  the structural design issues facing 
income security provisions. Since our central focus is on income security de- 
livered via the tax system, we follow the main features used to design a per- 
sonal tax. Section 3.4 examines the choice and definition of the tax and trans- 
fer unit. In section 3.5 we assess the appropriate tax and transfer base, that is, 
the measure of ability to pay taxes and need for transfers. Section 3.6 investi- 
gates important timing issues, such as payment frequency and responsiveness, 
and their implications for horizontal equity. Section 3.7 is an assessment of 
the effective marginal tax rates implied by various income security provisions 
in the tax system. Section 3.8 considers program simplicity and possible rea- 
sons for the undue overlap and complexity of  existing income security and 
taxation provisions. In section 3.9 we speculate about the future evolution of 
income security systems in Canada and the United  States and the potential 
role for tax provisions. We consider further the outlook for future harmoniza- 
tion of income security across the two countries. 
3.2  The Canadian Income Security Systems 
Income security in Canada consists of  general cash transfer programs, in- 
kind provisions and subsidies, personal tax provisions, features of other taxes, 
and the finance of  social insurance. These various types of  provisions have 
numerous linkages, often through their treatment in the personal tax system. 
We  will review  the  primary provisions,  lumping  social insurance benefits 
under the category of general cash transfers. Some important cash transfers, 
such as the demogrants, will be  discussed under the personal tax heading, 
where they can be treated under the categories of “children” and “the elderly.” 
Only the most general descriptions are offered in this section; more detailed, 
but selective, analyses of  particular provisions are provided in sections 3.4 
through 3.8. Overview descriptions of the comparable U.S. income security 
provisions are provided in section 3.3. A summary of the key income security 
programs and related tax provisions for both countries appears in table 3.1. 
8. This section draws on CCH Canadian Limited  (misc. years), Canadian Tax  Foundation 
(misc. years), and government documents describing taxation and income security programs. 102  Jonathan R. Kesselman 
Table 3.1 
Program or Provision  Canada  United States 
Summary of Key Income Security Programs and Tax Provisions, 1990 
General Cash Transfers 
Income-tested 
Demogrants 





Personal Income Tax 
Filing Basis for Couples 




Social Assistance (SA)-categorical; 
provincial programs with federal 
cost-sharing 
(GIs), Spouse’s Allowance-for 
elderly; federal; some provinces 
supplement 
Guaranteed Income Supplement 
Family Allowances (FA), Old Age 
Security (OAS) 
Public medical and hospitalization 
insurance; universal 
comprehensive coverage; 
provincial with federal block cost- 
sharing 
public housing, tax credits for low- 
income renters, provincial and 
municipal 
Limited provision of subsidized 
None 
Limited provision of income-tested 
subsidies 
Individual, except that very low- 
income spouse is included on 
taxpaying spouse’s return 
Nonrefundable tax credit 
Nonrefundable tax credit, offset by 
part of spouse’s income; income 
attribution rule to deter income- 
splitting 
Nonrefundable tax credits 
Equivalent-to-married tax credits for 
Tax deductibility of child-care costs 
single parents 
Income attribution rule to deter 
income-splitting 
Nonrefundable tax credit 
Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC), Public 
Assistance-categorical;  state 
programs with federal cost- 
sharing 
Supplemental Security Income 
(SS1)-for  elderly and 
disabled; federal; most states 
supplement 
None 
Medicare-for  elderly and some 
disabled, limited coverage, 
federal. Medicaid-for  the 
poor; state with federal 
sharing 
Subsidized public housing, tax 
incentives for private 




Limited provision of income- 
tested subsidies 
Joint return for married couples; 
income fully aggregated, 
wider tax brackets for couples 
Personal exemption, phased out 
at very high incomes; also a 
standard deduction for filers 
who do not itemize their 
deductions 
Personal exemptions, phased 
out at very high incomes 
Personal exemptions, phased 
out at very high incomes 
Head-of-household tax filing 
status for single parents 
Income-related tax credits for 
child care costs 
Some attribution of  child’s 
income to parent’s tax return 
(kiddie tax) 
deduction 
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Table 3.1  (continued) 
Program or Provision  Canada  United States 
Disabled Status 
Refundable Credits 
Taxability of Transfers 
Clawback of Benefits 
Other Taxes 
Property Taxes 
Tax credit for $1 ,OOO  of private 
pension income 
Registered Retirement Savings Plans 
and Registered Pension Plans-to 
tax-shelter savings for retirement 
Nonrefundable tax credit and 
deduction for expense of part-time 
attendant needed in order to work 
Tax credit for medical expense above 
threshold 
Refundable child tax credits and 
refundable sales tax credits, both 
income-tested 
Low-income, property-tax, renters, 
or cost-of-living tax credits, some 
provinces 
unemployment insurance (UI) 
Taxable: FA, OAS, CPP/QPP, 
Nontaxable: SA, GIS, workers’ 
compensation, in-kind benefits 
FA and OAS clawback above middle 
UI partially clawed back above 
incomes 
middle incomes 
Provincial homeowners’ grant or 
seniors’ grant 
Social Insurance and Finance 
Unemployment Insur-  National program, comprehensive 
ance  coverage, no experience rating; 
employer and employee premiums; 
tax credits for employee premiums 
Provincial public programs, limited 
experience rating 
Canada and Quebec Pension Plans 
(CPP/QPP)-retirement  benefits 
modest, supplemented by OAS and 
GIS; benefits closely linked to 
individual’s lifetime contributions; 
no earnings test on beneficiaries; 
tax credits for employee premiums 
Workers’ Compensation 
Retirement 
Nonrefundable tax credit for 
those with little Social 
Security benefits 
Individual Retirement 
Accounts-and  employer- 
based pension plans to tax- 
shelter savings 
Increment to the standard 
deduction for blindness 
Itemized deductions for medical 
expense above threshold 
Earned-income tax credits- 
based on earned income and 
presence of child in tax unit 
Sales tax credits, some states 
Taxable Social Security (half- 
taxable above lower-middle- 
income levels), UI 
Nontaxable: AFDC, public 




State “circuit-breaker’’ tax 
reliefs 
State programs, limited 
coverage, experience rating; 
entirely financed by employer 
premiums 
State and private provision, 
experience rating 
Old Age, Survivors, and 
Disability Insurance (OASDI) 
provisions of Social 
Security  -substantial 
redistributive tilt to the 
relation between an 
individual’s benefits and 
lifetime contributions; 
earnings test on beneficiaries 104  Jonathan R. Kesselman 
3.2.1  General Cash Transfers 
Welfare payments are delivered by the individual provinces under programs 
of “social assistance” (SA). There are significant interprovincial  variations in 
the eligibility requirements for social assistance, as well as the benefit levels. 
Some provinces,  such as those in the Atlantic region, severely restrict access 
to benefits by single persons without dependents.  Others, including Quebec, 
offer much lower benefit rates for young singles. However, national legislation 
provides  for federal cost-sharing of SA programs (and related  services) and 
also limits provincial discrimination against nonresidents and the use of wait- 
ing periods for  benefit^.^ Benefits are not taxable under the personal tax due 
to special relieving provisions but are almost always below the levels at which 
income would be taxable in any event. Asset tests as well as income tests are 
typically applied to claimants and beneficiaries. Most provinces will disregard 
modest amounts of  earnings but will otherwise reduce SA benefits dollar-for- 
dollar with increased earnings. 
The most common reasons for persons receiving SA are: unemployment, if 
jobless benefits are low or exhausted; single parenthood or inadequate income 
relative to family size; and various forms of disability. Persons with disabili- 
ties may  also qualify  for benefits  under two social insurance programs  not 
subject to asset tests. Every province offers a program of worker’s compensa- 
tion for injuries incurred on the work site. These plans are financed by em- 
ployer contributions,  and the benefits are not taxable due to special relieving 
provisions.  There are also limited benefits  for disability under  the Canada 
Pension Plan (CPP) and the Quebec Pension Plan (QPP), which are primarily 
earnings-linked  contributory  public  pension  schemes.  Some of  the  elderly 
also receive supplements  to their receipts from federal programs under ad- 
juncts to the SA programs in several provinces. 
Unemployment insurance is the single largest income security program in 
Canada. Its expenditures account for 1.7 percent of the country’s GDP even 
in periods of high employment. The program is national in scope, but contains 
eligibility and benefit duration provisions that are regionally graduated. Cov- 
erage of the program  is nearly  universal,  except for the  self-employed and 
persons working very short hours.  After a two-week jobless period, insured 
claimants who have worked sufficient weeks over the previous  year receive 
weekly  benefits  equal to 60 percent  of  their average insured  earnings.  The 
maximum level of insurable earnings is somewhat above the average full-time 
industrial wage. Benefits are fully taxable and subject to partial clawback at 
higher  incomes.  The duration  of  benefits  can range up to fifty weeks and 
hinges upon the claimant’s period of insured employment and the unemploy- 
9. From the inception of the Canada Assistance Plan in 1966, costs of most SA benefits and 
social services have been 50 percent shared by the federal government. The 1990 federal budget 
imposes spending restraints on CAP that may affect the sharing of costs for the three wealthier 
provinces. See Hum (1983) for analysis of CAP. 105  Income Security via the Tax System 
ment rate in the region. The UI program also encompasses benefits for sick- 
ness and maternity, as well as some work-sharing and training provisions. 
3.2.2  In-kind Provisions and Subsidies 
The primary forms of  in-kind provision for lower-income Canadians are 
public insurance for hospitalization and most health care expenses; these ser- 
vices are in fact provided to all Canadians, irrespective of income. They are 
delivered by the provinces and partially financed by  block transfers from the 
federal government. Federal legislation prevents the provinces from imposing 
user charges or coinsurance rates on users. Coverage under these schemes is 
virtually universal across the population. Only the two westemmost provinces 
still  charge  premiums  for  participation  in  their  medical-care  insurance 
schemes; Ontario abandoned such charges just  in  1990 and replaced them 
with a payroll tax. Persons receiving SA obtain a waiver from paying premi- 
ums, and almost no one is denied service even if  uninsured. The financial 
pressures of  such an open-ended arrangement have forced provinces to limit 
the range of covered services and have led to significant waiting periods for 
some medical and surgical procedures. Many provinces also reimburse a por- 
tion of  prescription drug costs above a threshold; most provinces reduce or 
waive the deductible for SA recipients and the elderly. 
Outside of  health care, Canadian in-kind public provisions and subsidies 
are less extensive than in the United States.'O Public supply of  housing and 
child care is quite limited, even for low-income families. There is somewhat 
greater reliance on private nonprofit groups to supply day care, and on coop- 
erative societies and subsidized private builders to supply low-income hous- 
ing. SA recipients may receive additional benefits or subsidies to help pay 
unusually high rental costs or to cover day care costs to facilitate their employ- 
ment. Many provinces will also provide discretionary amounts under Social 
Assistance for special needs such as children's winter clothing. Some prov- 
inces provide income-tested subsidies for day care expenses to persons who 
are not SA beneficiaries. Nonprofit day care centers may receive capital grants 
or other provincial funding. Several provinces provide income-tested tax cred- 
its to renters as part of the personal income tax. As previously noted, Canada 
has no food stamp program, although volunteer-run food banks have grown 
in recent years. 
3.2.3  Personal Tax Provisions 
The Canadian personal income tax is imposed at both the federal and pro- 
vincial levels, with nine of the ten provinces piggybacking their taxes onto the 
10. This study does not examine public education or higher education, despite their obvious 
links with poverty and income security. Public education in Canada is more uniform in quality 
across low- and high-income neighborhoods and municipalities than public education in the US., 
on  account of  extensive provincial financing. College and  university tuitions are  significantly 
lower in Canada than in most of the United States, although attendance is more limited and prob- 
ably more biased toward students with higher class origins than in the U.S. 106  Jonathan R. Kesselman 
federal tax; only Quebec imposes its provincial  income tax  separately.  The 
individual is the basic unit for taxation in all jurisdictions, with adaptations to 
include in a tax filer’s return the low earnings of a dependent spouse and chil- 
dren. Spouses and children whose incomes exceed modest levels are account- 
able for their own personal tax returns. Canada has pioneered many types of 
tax credits that serve income security objectives for the poor and horizontal 
equity goals for the broader taxpaying population. The 1987 tax reforms fur- 
ther extended the use of nonrefundable tax credits to replace personal exemp- 
tions and many items that were formerly deductible (see Cloutier and Fortin 
1989). Because provinces apply their taxes at 47 to 62 percent of the taxpay- 
er’s basic  federal tax, the total  value of  the nonrefundable  credits is corre- 
spondingly magnified. ’I Our review of  these provisions  and related income 
transfer programs is classified by four demographic groups-nonaged  adults, 
children, the elderly, and the disabled. 
Nonaged  Adults 
Every person who files a tax return in Canada can claim a nonrefundable 
tax  credit. These personal  tax  credits  replaced  personal  exemptions in the 
country’s major tax reforms of  1987, which  first became  effective with the 
1988 tax year.I2  A nonrefundable credit for the filer can be made equivalent to 
a personal  exemption through appropriate  adjustments  to the  income-break 
points for the progressive tax rate schedule. The Canadian reforms made the 
conversion from exemptions to credits more valuable for low-income tax filers 
and less valuable for high-income  filers. The nonrefundable credits for filers 
also replaced a deduction intended to cover employment expenses. Hence, the 
credits now are the sole tax-relieving device for low-income filers in Canada; 
there is no standard deduction or other such provision. In 1988 the basic filer’s 
tax credit was set at $1,020; the basic tax exemption for a filer would have 
been about $4,270 if the previous system had been continued.  (All amounts 
for Canadian tax and spending provisions in this study are given in Canadian 
dollars; all amounts for U.S. provisions are in U.S. dollars.) The levels of the 
two provisions are not directly comparable because the federal tax rate sched- 
ule was also collapsed from ten brackets to three-17,  26, and 29 percent. 
Still, the taxable income threshold was increased by the reforms. Tax credits 
and boundaries on the rate brackets are indexed annually for inflation, to the 
extent that it exceeds 3 percent. 
11. Basic federal tax is an amount prior to reduction by  the refundable federal credits. Hence, 
the refundable federal credits do not assume additional value with provincial taxation. 
12. In the tax years from 1965 through 1985, Canada also had a wide variety of nonrefundable 
tax credits provided as “general tax reduction.” These were usually a stated percentage of federal 
tax otherwise payable, with a minimum and/or maximum amount of credit; in some years there 
was a flat amount per filer and spouse, and in 1977 and 1978 an amount per child was added. See 
Kesselman (1979) for analysis of these credits and the refundable child tax credits. 107  Income Security via the Tax System 
Married persons with relatively low incomes are claimed on their spouses’ 
return but must file separate returns if they have a taxable level of income. The 
filing spouse can claim a marital tax credit,  which  is a maximum amount 
($850 in  1988) reduced by  a portion (17 percent) of  the dependent spouse’s 
income above a disregard level. This marital credit phases out to zero at an 
income at which the dependent spouse must file a separate return. A single 
parent can also claim an “equivalent to married” credit on behalf of the first 
child. Many deductible or creditable expenses in the income tax can be trans- 
ferred to a spouse or supporting parent when the spouse or child is unable to 
claim the full amount on account of insufficient taxable income. Hence, there 
is a limited degree of income-splitting for low-earning spouses and children, 
in a variety of circumstances. However, there are extensive income attribution 
rules to inhibit the splitting of  investment incomes for tax purposes through 
intrafamilial transfers of assets. 
Refundable sales tax credits are offered to offset a portion of  the federal 
manufacturers’ sales tax, which enters the prices of  many consumer goods. 
These  credits  predated  the  1988 reforms  by  several  years.  They  can  be 
claimed by lower-income tax filers, or a short tax return can be filed by non- 
taxable persons  to  claim their credits.  The RSTC  is  specified as a  given 
amount per adult plus a given amount per child in the household; this maxi- 
mum total is reduced by 5 percent of  the couple’s combined net income ex- 
ceeding a threshold ($18,000 in 1990). The maximum will be enriched and 
the phaseout  threshold greatly increased in  1991, when the credits will be 
renamed the Goods and Services Tax (GST) credits. The goal is to offset the 
increased federal sales tax burdens at lower incomes when the tax is converted 
to a value-added tax format. Indexation for inflation above 3 percent annually 
will be applied to the credit amounts and phaseout threshold. 
Dependent Children 
The Canadian tax and transfer treatment of dependent children is a web of 
overlapping and interacting provisions. First are the nonrefundable child tax 
credits for children, claimable by a supporting parent and reduced by a portion 
of a child’s income above a disregard level. The credits assume different val- 
ues for the first two children under 19, other children under  19, and infirm 
dependents 18 and older. These credits replaced tax exemptions for dependent 
children in the 1988 tax year. Second are the child credits within the RSTC, 
which will be enlarged with their replacement by  refundable GST credits in 
1991. Third are the refundable child tax credits (RCTC), which were intro- 
duced in 1978 and formed the model for the later RSTCs. Fourth are the Fam- 
ily Allowance demogrants, monthly payments of  about $33 for each child, 
irrespective of  family income. The FA  payments have been  taxable to the 
higher-income parent for many years.  Beginning in  the  1989 tax  year and 
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complete clawback as either parent’s income rises above $50,000. There are 
also tax deductions for child care expenses of working parents and a recently 
introduced small tax credit for minding one’s own child at home.I3 
Quebec uses both tax and spending powers to operate the continent’s only 
pronatal policy. This reflects the province’s desire to maintain its Francophone 
population in the face of low birth rates. Following the national tax reforms, 
Quebec converted from personal exemptions to nonrefundable personal cred- 
its in reforming its own tax in 1988. However, in Quebec the credit per child 
is nearly 40 percent of  the  filer credit, whereas federally  the child credit is 
only 6 to 13 percent of  the filer amount. Quebec provides provincial family 
allowances in addition to the federal payments, and it gears these payments to 
favor larger families. The province further supplements its family allowances 
with  “availability  allowances” paid  to families with  children under age six; 
these increase sharply with the family’s number of children of all ages. Que- 
bec also provides lump payments, in installments,  for newborn children.  In 
late 1989 these were $500 for the first child in a family, $1,000 for the second 
child, and $4,500 for the third and each subsequent child. None of these pro- 
vincial payments is taxable or subject to clawback. 
The Elderly 
The elderly also face a combination of tax and transfer provisions aimed at 
income security. First is the nonrefundable tax credit for persons aged 65 and 
over, which replaced a comparable tax deduction for age. This amount ($550 
in 1988) is in addition to the basic filer’s credit and can also be claimed for an 
elderly spouse. Second is the federal demogrant program of Old Age Security, 
which makes payments to all elderly Canadians who have met a minimal res- 
idence requirement.  Monthly benefit levels in 1990 are over $340 per elderly 
person. OAS payments are taxable and have further become subject to claw- 
back, beginning in 1989, for recipients with incomes above $50,000. Third is 
the federal Guaranteed Income Supplement, which acts like a guaranteed in- 
come for the elderly.  Maximum  monthly benefits  are over $400 per  single 
person and $520 per couple; payments are reduced by 50 percent of the recip- 
ient’s other income  (excluding  OAS). Fourth, many  provinces  supplement 
GIS payments for very low income seniors, and their phaseout rates can in- 
crease the  total effective marginal tax rate to 75 or 100 percent,  depending 
upon how they are combined with the GIS benefit reduction rate. 
Other tax and social insurance provisions are aimed at savings for retire- 
ment.  The first $1,000 of a taxpayer’s  annual pension  income from private 
sources obtains a credit at the bottom-bracket  rate; prior to the  1988 tax year 
there was a deduction instead. Consumption tax treatment is given to specified 
13. Child care expenses are deductible against earned income of  the lower-income parent in the 
federal and most provincial income taxes; in the Quebec income tax, they can be deducted by the 
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amounts  of  savings  through  employers  (Registered  Pension  Plans)  and 
through private trusteed accounts (Registered Retirement Savings Plans). Re- 
forms originally announced in 1986 and now being implemented will provide 
a more balanced treatment of permitted amounts of  savings through these two 
vehicles,  as well  as between  defined-benefit  and  money-purchase  pension 
plans.  Tax deferral will be allowed on 18 percent of a taxpayer’s earned in- 
come up to an annual limit  of  $15,500 of  savings in  1995, which  will  be 
indexed for subsequent growth of  average wages.  The Canada and Quebec 
Pension Plans are mandatory contributory public pension schemes. CPP/QPP 
benefits are roughly proportional to the contributor’s lifetime contributions. 
Benefits are paid without any earnings test but are fully taxable. The schemes 
are partially funded, with most assets in the form of loans to the provinces. 
The Disabled 
In addition to the Social Assistance payable to most unemployable disabled 
persons, there are also tax provisions  to relieve the position of  the taxable 
disabled. An additional tax exemption amount was converted to an additional 
credit of $550 for disability in 1988. The definition of  disability for this credit 
has been broadened  from a narrowly prescriptive one (blindness or confine- 
ment to a wheelchair  or bed) to a much broader functional one (“markedly 
restricted  in  activities  of  daily living”).  Disability  must be certified by  the 
claimant’s  physician. Disability  credits  are nonrefundable  but can be trans- 
ferred to the tax return of the disabled person’s spouse or supporting parent. 
Medical  expenses exceeding 3 percent  of the taxpayer’s net income can be 
claimed for a nonrefundable credit computed at the bottom-bracket rate; this 
provision replaced the former tax deduction for such expenses. The medical 
expense credit is available to all taxpayers and can be claimed by the lower- 
income spouse with respect to the entire family’s medical expenses.  In  1989 
the working disabled were granted a deduction  of  up to $5,000 for the ex- 
penses of a part-time attendant required to enable an individual to work. 
3.2.4  Other Taxes and Social Insurance Finance 
Some of the provinces offer tax relief for persons at lower incomes through 
income-conditioned  credits to offset sales taxes, property taxes, or the pre- 
sumed property tax component of  residential rents. Others offer grants to off- 
set part of the property tax, in some cases with an additional amount for el- 
derly homeowners. Many U.S. states provide similar “circuit-breaker’’ relief 
of property taxes to elderly or poor homeowners through refundable income 
tax credits. The provincial  share of  financing for hospitals and medical care 
comes out of  general’  revenues,  but  several provinces  have imposed payroll 
taxes on employers earmarked for health  spending.  Provincial programs  of 
workers’ compensation are financed by levies on employers; some provinces 
apply different rates by industry or even a limited form of experience rating 
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tax at a somewhat higher level of income than the tax threshold for the federal 
personal tax. Quebec parallels many of  the nonrefundable credits from the 
federal income tax in its provincial tax. 
The federal social insurance programs are almost fully premium-financed. 
Although the UI  program  had  substantial general-revenue financing in  the 
early 1970s, this was reduced in the later 1970s and eliminated in 1991. Em- 
ployer premiums are 1.4 times employee premiums; both are based on insur- 
able earnings up to a ceiling that somewhat exceeds the average full-time in- 
dustrial wage. Finance of  the Canadian UI program utilizes no experience 
rating, although the idea has periodically been  entertained (see Kesselman 
1983; Cousineau 1985). The Canada Pension Plan is financed by  premiums 
applied equally to employers and employees. In 1990 the rates were 2.2  per- 
cent for each party on annual earnings between an exempt level of $2,800 and 
a ceiling of  $28,900.  Premium rates are scheduled to rise steadily over the 
next generation to maintain the program’s financial viability. Still, the overall 
Canadian income security system for the elderly relies much more heavily 
than the U.S. system on general-revenue financed programs, such as OAS and 
GIs. This balance tilts the Canadian system sharply toward a pay-as-you-go 
basis, despite the partial degree of funding of the CPP/QPP programs. 
Although receipts of UI and CPP benefits are taxable, benefits from work- 
ers’ compensation programs are not. For UI recipients whose annual income 
exceeds 1.5  times the program’s maximum annual insurable earnings, benefits 
are subject to a clawback of up to 30 percent through a provision in the income 
tax.  This provision predates the clawbacks recently imposed on FA  and OAS 
receipts at higher incomes. The employee’s UI  and CPP premiums receive 
nonrefundable credits at the bottom-bracket tax rate. Prior to the 1988 tax year 
they were deductible in the personal income tax. Employers’ shares of these 
premiums are fully deductible from personal and corporate income taxes. 
3.3  The U.S. Income Security SystemI4 
3.3.1  General Cash Transfers 
The individual states provide welfare payments under programs of  public 
assistance, particularly for families with dependent children. Federal rules 
establish the general requirements for eligibility under Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children, including income and asset tests and prohibition of resi- 
dence requirements for citizens. The federal government matches state wel- 
fare costs,  with the federal share inversely related to a state’s financial re- 
sources. As in Canada, there are significant interjurisdictional variations in 
the benefit levels. Most welfare recipients are also eligible for Medicaid, food 
14. This section draws on Commerce Clearing House, Inc. (misc. years), U.S. Advisory Com- 
mission on Intergovernmental Relations (1990). Rejda (1988), MacDonald (1977). and govem- 
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stamp, and social service benefits; where locally available, public housing, 
energy assistance payments,  and reduced-price or free school lunches may 
also be obtained. The states typically impose work requirements on employa- 
ble beneficiaries, ranging from work tests to subsidized employment to com- 
munity service. For  an initial period, a beneficiary may keep $30 plus one 
third  of  monthly  earnings; after that  period,  any earnings reduce  benefits 
dollar-for-dollar. 
Disability and old age are other conditions that the states cover in their 
income security provisions. Every state has a workers’ compensation law for 
employment-related injuries.  Unlike  the  monopoly  operation  of  workers’ 
compensation by the Canadian provinces, most states allow employers to pur- 
chase policies from a private insurer or to self-insure. Some states also allow 
the purchase of insurance from a competitive state fund, and a few make cov- 
erage elective for firms. Most of the states provide income-tested benefits to 
supplement federal programs for impoverished elderly and disabled persons. 
Social Security has two major cash benefits: the earnings-related Old-Age, 
Survivors, and Disability Insurance program, and the income-tested Supple- 
mental Security Income program. These federal programs are reviewed later 
in this  section,  along with relevant taxation provisions for the elderly and 
disabled. 
Unemployment insurance is delivered as a series of  state programs with 
partial financing through federal tax rebates to the states against a federal pay- 
roll tax on employers. Receipt of these rebates by a state is contingent upon 
meeting certain federal minimum standards and the use of experience rating 
in the UI  payroll taxes imposed on individual firms. The states use several 
experience-rating methods, most of which set upper and lower bounds on the 
rates paid by any firm, regardless of how high or low its layoff rate has been. 
During some years the federal government has also enacted special programs 
to extend the period of regular unemployment benefits, based on high unem- 
ployment. Few states require any employee contributions. Coverages of the 
state plans are typically less comprehensive than the Canadian scheme. Aver- 
age benefit rates are somewhat lower, as are benefit durations, and most states 
will completely deny benefits to workers who have voluntarily left their jobs. 
Total expenditures on UI in the United States account for just 0.3 percent of 
GDP, less than one-fifth of the corresponding figure for Canada. 
3.3.2  In-kind Provisions and Subsidies 
Limited health care insurance is provided to the aged, disabled, and poor 
under two governmental programs. The federal Medicare program covers all 
of  the elderly and the disabled who have drawn long-term Social Security 
benefits. It provides partial insurance for inpatient hospital care and limited 
home health-care services; it also offers a voluntary, supplementary medical 
insurance plan for doctors’ services and outpatient care. None of these bene- 
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charges. The supplementary plan has monthly charges for participation. Med- 
icaid is a series of  state programs with federal cost-sharing inversely related 
to a state’s per capita income. It covers most of the health care costs of welfare 
recipients and of most persons drawing income-tested benefits under the fed- 
eral Supplemental Security Income program for the aged and disabled. States 
may  also extend coverage to medically  needy persons  who are not benefi- 
ciaries of welfare or SSI. 
Although general welfare benefits are quite low  in many states, they are 
usually supplemented by  access to several in-kind benefits and subsidies. In 
addition to the cited health  care  benefits for the poor,  these  include food 
stamps, public housing, child care subsidies, energy assistance, and free or 
reduced-price school lunches. All these benefits are provided on an income- 
tested basis; often the person must be eligible for welfare to obtain the other 
benefits. The linkage of  benefits and sequencing of  income tests can create 
very high cumulative effective marginal tax rates, or what has been called the 
“poverty trap.” None of these benefits nor the public health care benefits con- 
stitute taxable income, as they are already income-tested. Note, however, that 
most welfare recipients do not receive all of  these in-kind benefits. Some are 
not available in every state or locale; and some, such as public housing, may 
be rationed by waiting lists as well as income tests. Many persons who do not 
qualify for werfare are still eligible for food stamps. 
3.3.3  Personal Tax Provisions 
The 1986 Tax Reform Act constituted a major rewriting of  the U.S. code 
for personal income taxation. Some of  its provisions were first operative in 
the 1987 tax year, with others phased in over several years. Forty states also 
impose broad-based personal income taxes that they administer themselves. 
Many state tax provisions are linked to the federal tax concepts and therefore 
were automatically recast with the federal reforms. Other states have explic- 
itly redrafted their laws to conform with the broadened taxable base in the 
federal tax. Several state income taxes use nonrefundable credits instead of 
personal exemptions. The federal tax collapsed its rate structure to two posi- 
tive rates of  15 and 28 percent; there is also a 5 percent surtax at upper-income 
levels.15  While the federal reforms were primarily aimed at broadening the 
taxable base to facilitate the rate reductions, a number of the changes have an 
impact upon  income security and horizontal equity.  We  will  review these 
changes for the same four demographic groups as we did for the Canadian tax 
reforms. Income transfer programs aimed at the elderly and disabled are also 
covered. 
15. In 1989, only a few states had top marginal tax rates as high as 10-12  percent. Because 
state income taxes are an itemized deduction in computing an individual’s federal tax, only a 
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Nonaged Adults 
Personal exemptions are allowed for each tax filer, spouse of the filer, and 
dependent child.  l6 The reforms raised the amount of the per capita exemption 
from $1,080 in  1986 to $1,900 in 1987, with phased increases to $1,950 in 
1988, $2,000 in  1989,  and  indexation to  consumer prices  for later years 
(yielding $2,050 in 1990). A 5 percent surtax is imposed above specified in- 
come levels to tax back first the benefits of the 15 percent rate bracket and then 
the benefits of personal exemptions. This surtax creates an additional effective 
rate bracket, of 33 percent, in the middle of the 28 percent bracket.” The tax 
further allows a standard deduction for filers who choose not to claim itemized 
tax deductions for allowable expenses. For the 1990 tax year,  the standard 
deductions were $3,250 for single filers, $5,450 for married couples filing 
jointly  ($2,725 if  filing separately), and $4,750 for household heads. The 
standard deductions are a vital element in setting the minimum taxable thresh- 
old at lower incomes. 
Four distinct rate schedules apply to the following groups: single persons, 
married persons filing jointly, married persons filing separately, and heads of 
households. After the 1986 reforms, all filers face the same rates (15 and 28 
percent), but the applicable income brackets differ by  group. Joint filing is 
most common among married couples and confers tax savings when the in- 
comes of  the two differ substantially. For couples with similar incomes, the 
system imposes a higher tax burden than the two would face if  unmarried. 
Prior to the 1986 reforms there was a second-earner deduction (10 percent of 
the lower-earning spouse’s earnings up to $30,000) to mitigate this “marriage 
penalty.” It also served to moderate the higher marginal tax rate facing the 
lower-earning partner under joint  filing. The  1986 reforms eliminated  the 
second-earner deduction, on the rationale that married couples would be com- 
pensated by adjustments to the standard deduction and the rate schedule. Un- 
married heads of  household enjoy a larger standard deduction and a more 
favorable rate schedule than single persons. 
Dependent Children 
As already noted, a dependent child generates an exemption of $2,050 that 
can be claimed by a supporting adult. This is subject to the 5 percent surtax to 
16. From  1975 to 1978, the U.S.  provided a “general tax credit,” which in 1978 equaled the 
greater of $35 for each personal exemption or 2 percent of the first $9,000 of taxable income. The 
credits were nonrefundable and in addition to  the $750 per-capita personal exemptions. In  1978 
the president proposed to replace all of these provisions with nonrefundable per-capita credits of 
$240, but  Congress instead raised the personal exemptions to $l,OOO in  1979. For background 
analysis, see Danziger and Kesselman (1978). 
17. Benefits of the  15 percent bracket are recovered above 1990 taxable incomes of $47,050 for 
a single filer, $67,200 for a head of household, and $78,400 for joint married filers. The personal 
exemptions are recovered only above taxable incomes of $97,620 for a single filer, $134,930 for 
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recover the tax savings at very high family incomes. The 1986 reforms pre- 
cluded a child from claiming a personal exemption on the child’s own tax 
return if he or she could be claimed as a dependent on another’s return. Such 
a child may still use up to $500 of his standard deduction to offset his unearned 
income, and his full standard deduction to offset his earnings. Unearned in- 
come over $1,000 of children under age 14 has become taxable at the parents’ 
marginal  tax  rate-the  “kiddie tax.” The  1986 tax  act included  sweeping 
changes to the taxation of trusts, in particular grantor trusts and generation- 
skipping trusts. These reforms have severely curtailed the ability of families 
to shift taxable incomes to members in lower rate brackets. They also have 
increased the tax filing requirements for children and the number of children 
who have to pay taxes on their earned incomes. 
Two U. S.  tax credit provisions are linked to the presence of dependent chil- 
dren. These predate the  1986 reforms and survived with minor changes to 
their credit and phaseout levels. First is the earned-income tax credit, which 
is a refundable tax credit based on earnings of tax units with at least one de- 
pendent child (see Steuerle 1990). For the 1990 tax year the EITC could be 
claimed by  a supporting adult at a rate of  14 percent on the first $6,810 of 
earned income (for a maximum credit of  $953). The credit is phased out at a 
rate of  10 percent for incomes between $10,730 and $20,264 in 1990. Claim- 
ants can file certificates with their employers to have an advance portion of the 
EITC added to their paychecks throughout the year. Second is the provision 
of  nonrefundable credits for dependent-child-care expenses of  working par- 
ents. The credit rates decline with increase in the adjusted gross income of the 
claiming tax unit. In  1990 the credits were 30 percent of allowable expenses 
for filers with  incomes of  $10,000 and less, declining to 20 percent of  ex- 
penses for filers with incomes above $28,000. As in Canada, these tax provi- 
sions for child care expense are applied to the earnings of the lower-earning 
parent. 
The Elderly and the Disabled 
Several of the key U.S. tax and transfer provisions are similar for the el- 
derly and the disabled. For persons who are elderly or blind, extra amounts 
can be claimed along with the standard deduction. For the 1990 tax year these 
increments were $800 for age or for blindness ($1,600 for age and blindness) 
for a single filer and $650 for each person over 65 or blind for joint married 
filers (that is, $2,600 where both are blind and aged). Prior to the 1986 re- 
forms, age and blindness were handled with personal exemptions. The earlier 
approach benefited even very high-income filers, who typically itemize their 
deductions rather than take the standard deduction. There is also a nonrefund- 
able tax credit for the elderly receiving little or no Social Security benefits and 
for the totally disabled receiving disability income. The credit is 15 percent of 
specified base amounts, depending upon the claimant’s filing status, reduced 
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Certain tax deductions are potentially available to all filers but have partic- 
ular relevance to the situation of the elderly and the disabled. Deductions for 
medical care expenses can be claimed along with other itemized deductions in 
lieu of the standard deduction. The 1986 reforms raised the threshold for med- 
ical care claims to 7.5 percent of the filer’s adjusted gross income, from the 
former 5 percent floor. The reforms also severely limited the tax deductions 
available for savings in Individual Retirement Accounts. Now  such deduc- 
tions are confined to low- and moderate-income taxpayers; upper-income tax- 
payers can deduct up to $2,000 of IRA contributions in a year only if neither 
the taxpayer nor the spouse is an active participant in a qualified pension plan. 
Tax-sheltered  treatment  remains  on  saving  undertaken  within  qualified 
employer-based  pension plans. 
The Social Security program provides two major types of cash benefit pro- 
grams for the elderly and the disabled, one contributions-related  and the other 
needs-based. Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance offers benefits re- 
lated to a claimant’s insured earnings over his or her working life.I8 The ben- 
efit formula for OASDI is highly skewed in favor of persons whose “average 
indexed monthly earnings” over their working lives were quite low. A special 
minimum benefit for low-income workers with long coverage lends a further 
redistributive tilt to the program. Beneficiaries under age 70 face an earnings 
test, which reduces benefits by 50 percent of earnings above a threshold; in 
1990 the earnings offset was reduced to one-third for beneficiaries between 
ages 65 and 69. Supplemental Security Income provides income- and assets- 
tested benefits for the aged, blind, and disabled. Payments can be made irre- 
spective of the claimant’s work history. The maximum benefits are quite low 
and  are further reduced by  50 percent of  earnings above a small disregard 
level. Most states supplement the federal SSI payments. 
3.3.4  Taxation of Benefits and Social Insurance Finance 
None of the income-tested cash benefits, such as welfare and SSI, and no 
in-kind public benefits or subsidies constitute taxable income in the United 
States. This avoids the compounding  of effective marginal tax rates that would 
result by taxing benefits that had already been subject to an income test. Work- 
ers’ compensation benefits are similarly nontaxable, even though they are not 
subject to an income test.I9 If these benefits, or any of the others, were to be 
made taxable, some upward adjustment of  benefit rates would be required to 
maintain their adequacy on an after-tax basis. The 1986 reforms made all 
unemployment insurance benefits received taxable. Previously, there had been 
18. The original 1935 act covered retirement benefits for the  aged; benefits for survivors, dis- 
ability, and Medicare were introduced over the following thirty years. Medicare was discussed 
earlier, and we do not review the survivors’ benefits here (as in the CPP,  benefits may be paid to 
survivors of insured persons under certain circumstances). 
19. Most disability pensions financed by  employers are taxable in Canada and the U.S. Note 
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an exclusion from tax of jobless benefits for persons with incomes below spec- 
ified thresholds ($12,000 for single filers and $18,000 for joint filers). Since 
1984, OASDI Social Security benefits have been partially taxable to house- 
holds with incomes above specified thresholds ($25,000 for single filers and 
$32,000 for joint filers; neither has been indexed). Taxable income includes 
the lesser of one-half of benefits or one-half of income (including half of ben- 
efits and all of  nontaxable interest income) above the threshold. One justifi- 
cation for the half-inclusion rate was that beneficiaries had never paid tax on 
the employer share of Social Security premiums. 
Finance of  UI  and workers’ compensation was discussed earlier. We  now 
turn to the finance of the other social insurance programs. The SSI component 
of  Social Security is financed out of federal general revenues. Like the Cana- 
dian public pension scheme, the U.S.  scheme is well  short of  being fully 
funded. The OASDHI component is financed by equal premiums on employ- 
ers and employees. Contribution rates in 1990 for each party were 7.65 per- 
cent of  a worker’s wages and salaries up  to $51,300, for a maximum total 
payment exceeding $7,800 (nearly eight times the comparable maximum for 
CPP). The employer premiums are deductible under the business’s income 
tax, but employee premiums receive no recognition in the personal tax. Con- 
tributions cover both cash benefits of OASDI and the Hospitalization Insur- 
ance portion (Part A) of  Medicare. The Supplementary Medical Insurance 
portion  (Part B) of  Medicare, is financed about one-quarter from the SMI 
premiums and the balance from general revenues. The United States also en- 
acted a surcharge on the federal income tax of  persons covered by  Part A 
Medicare at 15 percent of their tax in  1989 (to a maximum surcharge of $800 
per affected person), with scheduled rises to 28 percent in 1993. This “Medi- 
care tax” would have been used to finance coverage for catastrophic illness 
and prescription drugs, but it was repealed before coming into effect. 
3.4  The Tax and Transfer Unitz0 
Defining the benefit unit for income security serves many of the same ob- 
jectives as choosing the tax unit for personal taxation. The primary goal is to 
choose groups across which relative well-being can be assessed, so that in- 
come  support or tax  relief  can  be  appropriately targeted.  Achieving this 
horizontal-equity goal is inextricably linked with the measure of  well-being 
(usually some variant of income) and timing and accounting issues; these top- 
ics are treated in the following two sections. A benefit unit is usually taken as 
a group of persons across which there is some presumption that income and 
20. For the analytical foundations of this and the following two sections, see Kesselman (1982, 
1990b) and the references cited therein. Danziger and Kesselrnan (1978) and Kesselman (1979) 
are relevant to the present section; Pechman and Engelhardt (1990) also overlaps with some issues 
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other resources will be shared. Typically the group will be residing together, 
although in some cases separated married persons may be treated together. 
Once the benefit unit has been defined, it must be determined how  income 
security benefits and tax-relieving provisions should be  scaled for different 
types and sizes of  units. In addition to equity objectives, attention must be 
given to the ease of  tracking and aggregating incomes within the benefit unit 
and coordination with the unit used for personal tax purposes. 
3.4.1  Functional Aspects of the Unit 
Inconsistency of Tcuc  and Transfer Units 
Both Canada and the United States take some version of the nuclear family 
as the appropriate benefit unit for most income security programs, whether 
cash or in-kind. Social insurance programs traditionally operate more with the 
individual as both the contributory and the benefit unit, but there have been 
many compromises on the benefit side. Some features have been based on 
concerns over targeting benefits effectively, while others have been justified 
by  a family-need concept of  the socially insured contingency. In the early 
19709, the Canadian UI program offered a higher benefit rate  for jobless 
claimants with one or more dependents. OASDI retirement benefits are in- 
creased by  50 percent for the spouse of a retired worker, even if  the spouse 
never worked or made payroll contributions. Most survivor benefits under 
OASDI and CPP also take into account the financial situation of the surviving 
family. The American food stamp program operates on the basis of  an “eco- 
nomic unit” in which there are sharing of common cooking facilities and joint 
purchasing of food; this sometimes departs from the welfare unit. Federal SSI 
benefits are reduced by one-third for beneficiaries who live in another person’s 
home and receive support and maintenance there. 
As  previously noted, the U.S. income tax allows married couples to file 
jointly. Most of  the states also permit some form of joint income tax filing. 
The Canadian tax allows joint filing only when one partner or a dependent has 
income below the taxable level. Hence, the taxable threshold in Canada has 
something of  a family basis. Otherwise the Canadian tax uses an individual 
tax unit. Yet  when income support provisions are included in the personal tax 
system, there are areas in which it uses family rather than individual income. 
Canadian refundable tax credits for children and for sales taxes each abate 
above an income threshold, which is applied to the joint incomes of the par- 
ents when both are present. In 1990, the thresholds for these phaseouts were 
$24,750 and $18,000 for the child and sales tax credits, respectively. With 
conversion of the sales tax credit to a Goods and Services Tax credit in 1991, 
the threshold increases to $24,800, but it will still be applied to a couple’s 
combined incomes. The phaseout rate on each of these credits for incomes 
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Income Aggregation in the Unit 
One functional aspect of defining the tax or transfer unit is to determine for 
which persons income will be aggregated to assess tax liability or benefit en- 
titlement. With a progressive-rate income tax, an individual unit induces per- 
sons to split or average their incomes across family members. The use of  a 
family unit may avoid creating these incentives, but it may affect incentives 
for persons to be married, depending upon the differential tax treatment of 
single and married persons. 21 Most income security provisions impose income 
tests with high  marginal tax rates on persons at the lowest incomes.  When 
these provisions overlap the personal income tax, they join at the relatively 
low  marginal  rates  of  the  bottom  bracket.  Hence, individuals  in  a family 
group would like to segregate all of their income in the hands of one member, 
so that the others can maximize their benefits. The purpose of a family benefit 
unit is to track and measure all members’ incomes so that they can be counted 
as joint resources in the computation of need. However, incomes of common- 
law or more casual partners may be difficult to track and to assess as a family 
resource for benefit purposes. Common-law relations are most often excluded 
from the tax definition of  married  status in both  countries,  based  on legal 
tradition and respect for privacy. 
Use of the individual tax unit in Canada places considerable pressure on tax 
enforcement to prevent  the  shifting of incomes or income-generating assets 
between spouses.  A variety of income-attribution rules on transferred assets 
has been  used to reduce the opportunities for income splitting. The United 
States introduced a “kiddie tax” and denied personal exemptions to dependent 
children on their own tax returns to reduce the opportunities for parents  to 
shift taxable income  from assets to their children.  One could  alternatively 
expand the U.S. tax unit  from the  married  couple to include children,  but 
doing this would raise the marginal tax rates on the work earnings of  many 
children. Both countries further extend the family tax unit beyond marriage to 
separated or divorced couples. In most circumstances, court-ordered alimony 
payments in the United States (and in Canada, maintenance payments as well) 
are deductible to the payer and taxable to the recipient, thus splitting the in- 
come. In the 1988 tax year, Canada extended the same tax treatment for main- 
tenance to separated common-law spouses. 
An anomaly arises in the income aggregation for the clawback on Family 
Allowance and OAS payments introduced in Canada in the  1989 tax year.** 
21. Income aggregation and the definition of  the tax unit also have economic efficiency impli- 
cations with a progressive tax rate schedule; see Boskin and Sheshinski (1983). 
22. The FA and OAS clawbacks were phased in over three years; in 1989 up to one-third of the 
benefits were clawed back, and by 1991 up to 100 percent of benefits have been recouped. The UI 
clawback,  in contrast, is limited to 30 percent of  benefits received; its threshold is just  under 
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Family Allowance receipts are clawed back at 15 percent of the higher-income 
parent’s net income exceeding $50,000 per year. Hence, a two-income family 
with total net income of $100,000 split equally between the partners will re- 
pay none of  its FA, whereas a single-income family with net income at all 
above $50,000 will bear the clawback. This failure to aggregate incomes for 
the clawback is a departure from the type of aggregation used for determining 
refundable child and sales tax credits; it would appear to be a violation of 
horizontal equity, as the concept is normally applied on a family basis for 
income security. Indeed, the income aggregation for the refundable credits is 
extended even to the unmarried parents of  a child.  OAS receipts are also 
clawed back at a rate of  15 percent, but the clawback applies to net income 
above $50,000 of the adult receiving the payment. 
Scaling of  Benejt Provisions 
Benefit levels of transfer programs, tax-relieving provisions, and tax-based 
transfers can be scaled in a variety of ways. The main methods include a per- 
capita basis,  scaling by  family size, and recognizing dependency or family 
relationships.  The  income-tested transfer  programs,  including welfare,  in 
both countries use variants of the family-size approach in setting maximum 
benefit levels. This approach reflects the scale economies of family living and 
the horizontal-equity notion of equalizing the well-being of different-size fam- 
ily units at the bottom of  the income scale. Social insurance programs typi- 
cally scale their benefits to the contributory earnings level of  the beneficiary, 
although they sometimes make adjustments for family size or need in partic- 
ular areas, such as survivor benefits. The Canadian demogrant programs of 
FA and OAS use a per-capita method (in 1990, monthly benefits of about $33 
per child and $345 per aged person). However, individual provinces may vary 
the payment pattern  for FA  benefits to reflect the number of  children in  a 
family or their ages. And there is an income-tested Spouse’s Allowance for 
spouses of OAS recipients and widowed persons aged 60-64. 
Tax-relieving provisions are designed to exclude low-income persons from 
paying personal income taxes, When Canada converted from personal exemp- 
tions to personal credits beginning with the 1988 tax year, it kept the scaling 
based upon age and family size and relationship. In  1990, the levels of these 
credits were as follows: basic filer, $1,049; married, $874; first two children 
under age 19, $68 each; other children under 19, $136 each; infirm depen- 
dents 18 and older, $257; and elderly or disabled, $566. These credits offset 
tax that would otherwise be paid; at the bottom-bracket rate of  17 percent, the 
basic filer credit is equivalent to a personal exemption of $6,169.23  The United 
States employs the per capita method for all personal exemptions, with a 1990 
23. On tax returns the personal credits are actually specified as exemption-equivalent amounts, 
and along with other creditable expenses, the filer multiplies their total by the bottom-bracket rate 
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level of  $2,050 per  adult or child  in the  family.24  As reviewed  earlier,  the 
standard deduction plays an important role in setting tax relief for low-income 
families. The extra exemptions for age and disability were converted to addi- 
tional amounts of standard deduction under the U.S. reforms. 
Both countries provide single-parent households with added relief to reflect 
their additional needs for living costs. Canada allows single-parent families to 
claim "equivalent-to-married"  credits (equal to marital  credits) on behalf of 
the first dependent child, instead of the much lower child credit amount. The 
United States allows unmarried heads of household to claim a larger standard 
deduction and to file under a more lenient tax schedule than single persons. In 
1990 these features raised the taxable threshold  by $1,500 (plus exemptions 
for dependents)  and reduced  taxes due on taxable incomes above $19,450. 
Note that both  countries also extend these provisions to single or separated 
adults who support an adult relative in their own home. 
Transfers delivered through  the  tax  system can also be  scaled in various 
ways. The Canadian refundable tax credits for children and sales tax are both 
on a per capita basis but differentiated by age. Child tax credits in 1990 were 
$575 per child. A supplement to the credit of $200 per child under age seven 
is also available, but this supplement is reduced by 25 percent of  deductible 
child care expenses. The sales tax credits have different values per adult and 
per dependent child; with their expansion to offset the Goods and Services Tax 
in  1991, they are scheduled to be $100 per child and $190 per adult.25  Pay- 
ment of the earned-income tax credit in the United States is conditional upon 
the presence of one or more dependent children in the home of the filer. The 
amount of the credit is proportional to earned income-14  percent of the first 
$6,810, to a maximum credit of $953 in 1990-and  is unaffected by the pres- 
ence of additional children beyond the first one. The income thresholds for 
phasing out these refundable credits are fixed amounts in both countries,  in- 
dependent of the family size or type. This fact seems to constitute a minor 
violation of horizontal equity at income levels where the phaseouts apply. 
3.4.2  Tax-Free Income Thresholds 
A  major distributive  aspect  of  both  the  Canadian  and  U.S. personal  tax 
reforms was the increase in tax-free income thresholds and the reduction  in 
the number of low-income taxpayers. The Canada Department of Finance pro- 
jected  that  its  reform package  would  increase  by  850,000 the  number  of 
lower-income tax filers who pay no federal income tax. The U.S.  tax reforms 
24. Before World War 11, personal exemptions in the U.S. departed from a per-capita pattern. 
Exemptions for children were much less than those for a filer or spouse, and in many years total 
exemptions for manied joint filers were more than twice those of  single filers. See Danziger and 
Kesselman (1978). 
25. Single parents will be able to claim an adult credit for one dependent child. In addition, 
single adults, including single parents, will be able to claim an additional credit equal to 2 percent 
of  net income between $6,169 and $1 1,169, for a maximum added credit of $100. This latter 
feature has elements of an earnings subsidy or EITC. 121  Income Security via the Tax System 
were estimated to relieve 6 million  persons who paid federal taxes in  1986 
from paying tax in 1988 (1987 was a transitional tax year for reforms). These 
numbers  are quite significant,  as they  also imply reduced tax liabilities  for 
many taxpayers  with  incomes  somewhat  above the  new,  increased  tax-free 
thresholds. The numbers of  persons required to file tax returns were also re- 
duced by the reforms. Still, the availability of refundable tax credits in both 
countries makes it worthwhile  for many  low-income persons to file returns 
even if  they  are not otherwise required to file. Filing  requirements are dis- 
cussed further in the section on timing and accounting issues. 
We can calculate tax-free income thresholds and compare them to the pov- 
erty thresholds for selected types of households.26  For Canada, three types of 
tax  thresholds  are constructed:  a “tax”  threshold  which  considers only the 
nonrefundable personal credits; a “tax-credit’’ threshold which also considers 
the two refundable credits; and a “tax-credit-FA’  threshold which further con- 
siders Family Allowance payments.  The tax threshold  is the highest level of 
income at which the household pays no federal income tax, ignoring the re- 
ceipt of refundable credits and demogrants. The tax-credit-FA threshold is the 
income level (including FA receipts) at which  a household’s federal income 
tax, net of refundable credits and including tax on FA, is just offset by gross 
FA.27  These figures include only federal personal income taxes. However all 
provinces except Quebec impose their income taxes as a percentage of  the 
federal tax, so that their tax thresholds are the same, though they are higher in 
those provinces that provide special tax reductions to relieve low-income tax- 
payers  .28 
Table 3.2 presents the results of these calculations for Canada in the 1990 
tax  year  for ten  groups:  aged singles and married couples;  nonaged  single 
persons with zero to two children; and nonaged married couples with zero to 
four children. The tax thresholds,  which encompass only the nonrefundable 
personal  credits, exceed  the poverty  threshold for just one group  (married 
aged  couples)  and  are less than  half  of  the  poverty  thresholds  for several 
groups (nonaged singles and married couples with two or more children). The 
tax-credit thresholds,  which also include the refundable credits, increase the 
taxable income level only modestly for units without children, but sharply for 
those with one or more children.  Still, the tax-credit  threshold exceeds the 
poverty threshold only for married aged couples, and even on this basis the 
single  nonaged  are  taxable  at  incomes  far below  their  poverty  threshold. 
The tax-credit-FA thresholds affect only units with one or more children; they 
26. For both countries, the poverty thresholds do not distinguish between adults and children; 
the same threshold applies to a two-adult unit and a single-parent unit with one child. 
27. The threshold does not consider OAS demogrants for aged taxpayers, since these are an 
integral part of  the Canadian retirement income system. OAS payments are reflected in  lower 
CPP/QPP benefits than the counterpart American OASDI retirement benefits. 
28. Because of  its own system of  credits and rates, Quebec taxes single persons at incomes 
somewhat below the federal tax threshold. And most provinces impose their taxes at incomes well 
helow the tax-credit and tax-credit-FA thresholds. 122  Jonathan R. Kesselman 
Table 3.2  Thresholds in Canada, 1990 
Thresholds 






Single, 1 Child 
Single, 2 Children 
Married 
Married,  1 Child 
Married, 2 Children 
Married, 3 Children 
























15,708  $17,949 
19,344  22,845 
12,879 
16,891  18,885 
20,268  23,770 
23,715  28,208 
26,726  3 1,409 
Sources: Poverty thresholds from Statistics Canada, Household Surveys Division, Income Dis- 
tributions by Size in  Canada, 1988, 13-207 (Ottawa: 1989). Tax thresholds computed from tax- 
ation provisions and rate schedules for the 1990 tax year. 
'Poverty thresholds are the Statistics Canada low-income cutoffs for households in urban areas of 
100,OOO-499,999  population;  1988 figures are projected to 1990 based on  actual inflation for 
1988-89  and a forecast 5 percent rate for 1989-90. 
bTax threshold considers only the effects of  nonrefundable credits for filer, dependent spouse, 
children, and age. This and the other thresholds assume one earner per family unit, and all are 
based on federal taxes (including 5 percent surtax) alone. 
LTax-credit  threshold considers the effects of tax threshold plus the refundable credits for children 
and sales tax as an offset to income taxes. 
dTax-credit-FA  threshold considers the effects of tax-credit threshold plus the net-of-tax Family 
Allowance benefits (without provincial variations) as an offset to income taxes. 
bring most such units above their respective poverty thresholds (except for 
married couples with one or two children).29 
Table 3.3 presents the poverty and tax thresholds calculated for the United 
States in  1990 for the same ten groups. The country has no demogrant pro- 
grams, but tax-credit thresholds have been calculated to reflect the earned- 
income tax credit as an offset to federal income taxes. Note that many states 
impose taxes at incomes below the federal tax thresholds, although some do 
have special relieving provisions for low-income taxpayers. The tabulated re- 
sults show tax thresholds that roughly equal or exceed the poverty thresholds 
for almost all groups. The only exceptions are single persons, both aged and 
nonaged, though the gap is quite small for the former. Tax-credit thresholds 
raise the minimum taxable-income levels only for units with children, and 
they have their largest effect for smaller families. The tax-credit threshold 
exceeds the tax threshold by  nearly $3,500 for a married couple with one 
29. For areas with population above one-half million, the poverty thresholds are 14 percent 
above those tabulated. In those areas the only group having a threshold (tax-credit or tax-credit- 
FA) as high as its poverty threshold is married aged couples. 123  Income Security via the Tax System 
Table 3.3  Thresholds in the United States, 1990 
Thresholds 
Canadian 






Single, 1 Child 
Single, 2 Children 
Manied 
Married,  1 Child 
Married, 2 Children 
Married, 3 Children 
























$13,416  15,257 
14,646  19,418 
10,947 
15,066  16,052 
16,296  20,205 
17,526  23,977 
18,756  26,698 
Sources: Poverty thresholds from Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Consumer 
Income,  Money Income  and Poverry  Status in  the  United States: 1988, series P-60, no.  166 
(October 1989); tax thresholds computed from taxation provisions and rate schedules for the 1990 
tax year; last column based on table 3.2. 
'Poverty thresholds are the average weighted thresholds, with amounts distinguished by age only 
for households of  one and two persons;  1988 figures are projected  to  1990 based on  actual 
inflation for 1988-89  and a forecast 5 percent rate for 1989-90. 
bTax threshold considers the effects of personal exemptions and standard deductions, including 
extra deductions for aged filers. This and the other threshold are based on federal income taxes 
alone. 
Tax-credit threshold  considers  the effects of  tax threshold plus the earned-income tax  credit 
(available only to units with one or more children) as an offset to income taxes. 
dThese figures are the U.S.-dollar values (converted at 85 cents per Canadian dollar) of the larger 
of the Canadian tax-credit or tax-credit-FA threshold for each household type. 
child, but by just about $1,000 for a married couple with four children. This 
difference reflects the structure of the EITC. These credits and their phaseout 
range are independent of  the number of  children in a family. In 1990, these 
credits were fully phased out at family incomes just under $20,300. 
Both Canada and the United States partially succeed in relieving their poor 
populations from income tax, if  one views the refundable credits and FA  as 
offsets against income tax.30  One major exception is single persons. Yet, other 
transfer programs in each country greatly relieve the situation of  poor aged 
single persons,  so it  is mainly  the nonaged single group that is taxable at 
poverty incomes. Married couples with one or two children also bear net tax 
at what are deemed poverty incomes in Canada, whereas in the United States 
these groups and their single-parent counterparts have tax-credit thresholds 
that substantially exceed the U.S.  poverty thresholds. But if a consistent no- 
30. Of course, this exercise ignores the indirect and payroll taxes borne by the poor; the former 
are sizable in Canada, the latter in the U.S. Indeed, the refundable sales tax credits and the EITC 
were originally intended as partial relief for these other taxes. 124  Jonathan R. Kesselman 
tion of  poverty is applied to the two countries, Canada goes further than the 
United  States  in  relieving the  poor  from  taxati~n.~'  After  accounting for 
the exchange-rate differential, Canadian poverty thresholds exceed those of 
the United States by 40-80  percent, depending on the household type. Cost- 
of-living differences between the two countries are not nearly that large. We 
can compare the two countries by converting into U.S. funds the larger of the 
Canadian tax-credit and tax-credit-FA thresholds; these are displayed in the 
last column of table 3.3. Clearly, Canada exempts from tax many people who 
would not be deemed poor in the United States. 
Without  indexation  or  discretionary  periodic  adjustments,  the  tax-free 
thresholds will decline in real value over time and cover a larger proportion of 
those at low incomes. Beginning with the  1974 tax year, Canada undertook 
full indexation to the consumer price index; this indexation included both per- 
sonal exemptions and the income break points for the tax rate schedule. The 
rate of indexation was reduced to CPI increases above a 3 percent annual floor 
beginning in 1986, and this limited indexation was continued with the substi- 
tution of  personal credits for exemptions in  1988. Beginning with the 1985 
tax year, the United States undertook full indexation of the tax brackets, stan- 
dard deductions, and personal exemptions. Personal exemptions were raised 
by  scheduled amounts for each of the tax years 1987 through 1989; their in- 
dexation resumed in 1990. Standard deductions and rate brackets were revised 
by  scheduled amounts for  1987 and  1988, after which  they have been  in- 
dexed. The lack of indexation in the U.S. tax through the earlier 1980s made 
many low-income persons taxable, and the 1986 reforms served to undo that 
damage. 
Indexation is also relevant for the continued effectiveness of income secu- 
rity provisions contained in the personal tax system. Since its inception in 
1978, the Canadian refundable child tax credit level and its income threshold 
for phaseout were indexed. In  1983 its phaseout threshold was frozen, then 
reduced in 1986, and indexed again for subsequent years. In addition to being 
indexed, the child credit level has been increased by additional, discretionary 
amounts in some years. The refundable sales tax credit levels and thresholds 
for phaseout were not indexed but raised periodically; with their conversion 
to GST credits in 1991, both will be indexed for inflation above 3 percent per 
year, as have the parameters of the RCTC since 1988. The $50,000 income 
threshold for clawing back Family Allowance and OAS payments also will 
have this limited indexation for 1990 and later tax years. In the United States 
the EITC has been fully indexed for inflation since 1984, for both the maxi- 
mum credit and the income range over which credits are phased out. However, 
the income thresholds above which up to half of  OASDI benefits are taxable 
($25,000 for single filers, $32,000 for married joint  filers) have  been  un- 
31. Canadian poverty thresholds are set at the incomes at which a particular household type 
spends a proportion of  its total income on food, shelter, and clothing that is 20 percentage points 
higher than that for an average-income family of the same type. 125  Income Security via the Tax System 
changed since their institution in  1984. Like the limited indexation of  the 
threshold for clawing back OAS and FA  benefits in Canada, this is a way of 
gradually implementing greater taxability or income testing on income secu- 
rity benefits. 
3.4.3 
One can devise a set of  personal exemptions and a set of  nonrefundable 
credits that are fully equivalent in terms of  their implied tax-free thresholds. 
Hence, the choice between exemptions and credits reflects mainly value judg- 
ments about the appropriate differentiation of tax burdens by  family size at 
taxable levels of income. These involve considerations of equity among single 
adults, married couples, and nonmarried couples. They also concern judg- 
ments about whether children are to be treated as consumer goods or as per- 
sons with needs as valid as those of adults. These views may be affected by 
the income level of the family; children’s welfare might be viewed as society’s 
responsibility for lower incomes but the family’s responsibility at higher in- 
come~.~~  We  do not pursue these issues here, but we examine the actual tax 
differentials by family size embodied in the Canadian and U.S. systems. The 
degree of rate progressivity affects the tax differentials of credit and exemption 
approaches. Under a pure flat tax the two would be fully equivalent even at 
taxable income levels, so the partial flattening of rate schedules in both coun- 
tries has moderated the differences. 
In  Canada the conversion of  the marital exemption to  a nonrefundable 
credit means that a dependent spouse with no income relieves the supporting 
taxpayer of a constant amount of taxes. The 1990 federal tax savings are about 
$920, almost independent of income (the exact value varies slightly because 
of the way that a two-tier surtax is applied). If the second spouse has a taxable 
level of income, there are no tax savings to the first spouse; both file separate 
returns. In the United States there can be much greater tax savings from mar- 
riage to an individual with no income. These savings result from the combined 
effects of  the larger standard deduction for married, as against single, filers, 
the extra personal exemption for the spouse, and the wider tax brackets for 
married joint filers. In  1990, the resulting federal tax savings from having a 
spouse with no income were $670 at family adjusted gross income (before 
claiming deductions and exemptions) of $25,000; $2,880 at $50,000 income; 
and $4,660 at $100,000 income. At  still higher incomes the benefits of  the 
spouse’s exemption are phased out, but large total tax savings remain. The 
U.S. rate schedules are constructed so that a tax penalty arises with marriage 
for persons with similar incomes. 
Tax differentiation by number of  children is more complex on account of 
the variety of  provisions. In Canada the nonrefundable credits for dependent 
children offer the same value in taxes saved independent of  the taxpayer’s 
Tax Differentiation at Taxable Incomes 
32. See Brannon and Morss (1973), Pogue (1974), and Mclntyre and Oldman (1977) 126  Jonathan R. Kesselman 
income.33  These credits are twice as large for the third and each subsequent 
child in a family as they are for each of the first two children. But other tax 
and transfer provisions  make the net dollar value of an additional child vary 
widely by family income. The refundable child tax credits and the child com- 
ponent of refundable sales tax credits are together much larger than the value 
of the nonrefundable  child credits. They are payable to families with no tax- 
able income, as well as to those with incomes up to the thresholds for phase- 
out. These credits are fully phased out at incomes below $60,000, even for 
three children. Family Allowance is paid to all families as fixed amounts per 
child, although some provinces  vary payments with the number or ages of 
children in the family. Payments are taxable and also subject to clawback as 
either parent’s income rises above a $50,000 threshold.  At higher family in- 
comes, the only remaining tax differential for a child is the nonrefundable tax 
credit, which is worth less than $70 in federal tax savings for each of the first 
two children. The overall pattern of differentials for a child by family income 
is generally to decline with income. But there are ranges of income over which 
it rises (income just becomes taxable where the nonrefundable credit assumes 
value) and has inequities (the clawback is based on the higher-income parent 
rather than on the parents’ combined income). 
The tax differentials for children in the U.S. system are simpler due to the 
number  and nature  of  related  provisions.  Each  extra child gives rise  to an 
additional personal exemption, $2,050 per capita in 1990. The value in terms 
of federal tax savings from an extra child is proportional to the rate bracket of 
the taxpayer. In the 15 and 28 percent brackets, the savings per child are $308 
and $574, respectively.  Moreover,  in the income ranges for clawback of  the 
benefits of  the 15 percent bracket, each exemption assumes a value of $677 at 
the effective marginal rate of 33 percent. It appears strange that the clawback 
of the bottom bracket should raise the tax differential for children at very high 
incomes. The personal exemptions themselves are clawed back at still higher 
incomes, so that  the  tax  differential for children  fully  vanishes.  Two other 
provisions in the U.S.  tax can give a substantial tax value to the first child in a 
family, beyond  the extra personal  exemption. The presence  of  a child  in a 
single-parent family qualifies the unit for both the higher standard deduction 
and the more favorable rate schedule of a head of household. And the presence 
of a child in a lower-income household usually qualifies the household for the 
EITC, though for separated or single parents conditions of child custody or 
household maintenance must be satisfied. 
3.5  The Tax and lkansfer Base 
The base of a tax system measures ability to pay taxes,  and the base of  a 
transfer system measures the need for support. Both are measures of the eco- 
33. This obtains so long as the taxpayer’s income is at a taxable level, and the value will vary a 
bit based on the filer’s surtax rate. 127  Income Security via the Tax  System 
nomic resources of the individual or household; typically some variant of in- 
come is employed. One might expect a well-designed base to serve equally 
well for tax  or transfer purposes,  with  individuals moving smoothly from 
being net taxpayers to net transfer recipients as their measured base declines. 
Such a uniform base would satisfy horizontal equity, as well as ease the coor- 
dinated operation of  the tax and transfer systems. However, one often finds 
different base measures for the two purposes, that is, collecting tax revenues 
and disbursing income security benefits. The base for transfers is most often a 
broader one than that  for taxes. This may reflect society’s more jaundiced 
view of beneficiaries than of taxpayers, or perhaps the two groups’ relative 
influence on the political process. This section assesses two main aspects of 
the base for income security issues: the inclusion in the tax base of  transfer 
receipts, and the bases used for income tests, clawbacks, and phaseouts built 
into the tax system. It also considers the equity aspects of expanding the tax- 
transfer base to include an imputed return on assets such as housing. 
3.5.1’  Transfers in the Tax Base 
Both countries exclude from their personal tax bases virtually all in-kind 
public transfer benefits and most income-tested transfers. Canada excludes 
benefits from Social Assistance, the CIS (and provincial supplements), and 
workers’ compensation, and the United States excludes its benefits from wel- 
fare, SSI (and state supplements), and workers’ compensation. Because the 
benefits of  these programs (except for workers’ compensation) are strongly 
income-tested, there is little overlap between recipients and taxable persons. 
But occasionally such a recipient will be taxable in a year when employment, 
disability, or age status changes so that the individual’s income rises or falls 
sharply. There can be horizontal inequity in the tax-transfer treatment of such 
an individual compared to others whose employment status has been more 
stable over the entire year. Yet  the tax exemption of such income-tested bene- 
fits does simplify the problems of  “rate stacking” or coordination to avoid 
excessive total marginal tax rates. 
Canada includes in the personal tax base the benefits of  the demogrants 
(OAS and FA) and the other social insurance programs (UI and CPP/QPP). 
None of the tax credits themselves are taxable, as they are subject to phaseout 
provisions. But some provincial welfare schemes may count tax credits and 
demogrants as part of their recipients’ resources. The amounts of demogrants 
(and UI) clawed back from a taxpayer are themselves tax deductible. This is 
necessary because FA  and OAS are taxable, as well as subject to clawbacks, 
and would otherwise be taxed at more than  100 percent. The United States 
includes in the personal tax base certain social insurance benefits-all  UI ben- 
efits since the 1986  reforms, and up to half of OASDI benefits above specified 
income  threshold^.^^  It  does not  count the benefits of  the EITC as taxable 
34. See Feldstein (1974) and Munnell(l986) for analysis of the effects of the earlier exclusions 
and the arguments for including in tax UI and OASDI benefits, respectively. 128  Jonathan R. Kesselman 
income, since they are subject to phaseout based on income. But EITC bene- 
fits are counted as resources in the income test for AFDC beneficiaries.  And 
the food stamp program includes in income such items as welfare cash bene- 
fits, workers’ compensation, UI benefits, and farm and training subsidies. 
3.5.2  Base for Tax Clawbacks and Phaseouts 
Stand-alone income transfer programs usually contain much broader mea- 
sures of resources, including asset tests, than personal taxes. Sometimes they 
will start with the tax measure of income and add in other items that are either 
excluded from or deductible from taxable income. For example, the GIS in- 
cludes tax-deductible retirement savings, the exempt portion of capital gains, 
and workers’ compensation benefits. The U.S. food stamp program considers 
AFDC, SSI, and workers’ compensation benefits in its computation of bene- 
fits. This tilt frequently carries over to personal tax provisions oriented toward 
income security objectives.  In Canada the refundable tax credits are condi- 
tioned on the taxpayer’s net income plus social transfer benefits that are oth- 
erwise nontaxable (Social Assistance,  GIs, and workers’ compensation).  In 
the United States, receipt of otherwise tax-exempt municipal and state bond 
interest affects the threshold for partial taxation of OASDI benefits; in effect, 
the interest becomes partially taxable. And disability payments and the value 
of  meals and lodging excluded from gross income qualify as earned income 
for computing EITC benefits. 
3.5.3 
Most stand-alone income security programs that are not structured as social 
insurance contain asset tests.  Several income security provisions in the per- 
sonal tax are conditioned upon a broader base than that used for taxation.35 
Both of  these approaches are an attempt to target the limited total available 
funds more effectively to persons most in need. Yet  asset tests are typically a 
very crude tool, with meager thresholds, above which benefits are completely 
denied. These tests discourage lower-income people from accumulating much 
in the way of financial assets, particularly those who expect to need support 
from time to time. Moreover, the asset tests of most welfare programs in both 
countries disregard equity in owner-occupied housing (sometimes up to spec- 
ified limits). This feature biases the composition of savings toward home own- 
ership, exacerbating the distortions of the income tax found in both countries. 
Other assets such as tax-sheltered  savings in  RRSPs and IRAs also do not 
enter into the measure of need, except in years when funds are withdrawn and 
become taxable. 
The cited deficiencies could be remedied by expanding the transfer base to 
include an imputed return on assets that do not yield current income, such as 
Arguments for a Broader Base 
35. See studies in Federal Council on the Aging (1977) for analysis of existing U.S.  provisions 
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home equity and tax-sheltered savings. In effect, this would broaden the base 
from current taxable income toward potential consumption. One might wish 
to use such a broadened base for transfers while retaining a somewhat nar- 
rower base for personal taxation. Tax-sheltered savings were instituted under 
the personal income tax precisely to allow tax deferral on the funds. A per- 
sanal tax on consumption would include net dissavings as part of its base but 
would not in principle count accruing incomes in  tax-sheltered  saving ac- 
counts. The key reason for using a broader base measure under a transfer than 
under a tax program relates more to the accounting periods and nonlinear 
character of  the tax-transfer system. An  individual can bunch  withdrawals 
from a tax-sheltered saving account so as to obtain large income security ben- 
efits in some years, interspersed with years when the individual lives off  the 
withdrawals. The next section examines these timing and accounting issues in 
greater depth. 
3.6  Tlming and Accounting Issues 
Any tax or transfer program has important timing issues, which are embod- 
ied in its accounting and administrative structure. These include the frequency 
of  benefit payment and income measurement and the accounting periods for 
payments and income measurement. The design of these timing features has 
major implications for the responsiveness of benefits to the changing needs of 
households, the horizontally equitable treatment of beneficiaries, and the net 
budgetary costs of an income security provision. There are further effects on 
the administrative and compliance burdens of the system, as well as the pos- 
sible need for recovery of overpayments. While these features may appear as 
mere technical details in the design of income security, they can vitally influ- 
ence the efficacy of policies in meeting their prime objectives. 
3.6.1  Frequency of Payment 
The frequency of income security payments and of tax-based transfer pay- 
ments affects the ease of household budgeting by beneficiaries. Some observ- 
ers would argue that frequent payments are important in assisting responsible 
spending behavior by  beneficiaries; others might argue that less frequent but 
larger payments facilitate the purchase of consumer durables by families who 
have difficulty in saving and little credit. Regardless of  one’s view on this 
matter, the income security objective requires that payments be sufficiently 
frequent to avoid problems of  destitution by  those beneficiaries who cannot 
budget well. Virtually all stand-alone income security programs offer frequent 
payments, either fortnightly or, at most, monthly. Similarly, some income se- 
curity provisions of  the personal tax system are delivered quite frequently. 
These include the basic  tax-relieving and tax-differentiating provisions that 
apply  to  all taxpayers  and  are  integrated into the tax  source-withholding 
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personal exemptions  and standard deductions.  These are delivered with the 
same frequency as the individual’s pay period. 
Other tax-based  transfers  that  are income-tested,  such  as the refundable 
provisions,  are typically delivered less frequently. The refundable child tax 
credits were originally paid out just once a year, following  the filing of tax 
returns  and based on the filer’s previous-year income. In the  1986 tax year, 
prepayment of two-thirds of a family’s RCTC was introduced, with payment 
in November based on the previous year’s  Payment of  the balance 
or recovery  of  excess advance payments  is accomplished with the next  tax 
filing. Upon the conversion of the federal sales tax credits to GST credits in 
1991, the  payment  will  be  changed  from annual to quarterly.  If  tax-based 
transfers  can  be  integrated  into  the  tax-withholding  mechanism,  they  can 
achieve still greater payment frequency. The EITC allows eligible individuals 
to elect to receive advance payments through their ernployer~.~’  Advance pay- 
ments are computed by the employer based on the claimant’s earnings in each 
pay period.  They are used to offset amounts required to be withheld for the 
claimant’s income tax and OASDHI payroll taxes. 
The formal requirements for filing an income tax return differ between the 
two countries.  Canada has no income threshold for requiring individuals to 
file. Rather, an individual must file only if tax is payable for the year beyond 
any amounts withheld at  In the United States, individuals must file a 
return if their gross income exceeds their tax threshold (as given in table 3.3), 
even if they have no taxes due.39  In fact, most of the working poor file returns 
in both countries to obtain a refund of taxes withheld, or to claim the EITC in 
the United States. Most other low-income Canadian persons also file returns 
in order to claim refundable child and sales tax credits. The refundable credits 
offered by some U.S. states attract additional filers. As a consequence, a great 
majority of poor and low-income households actually file returns; the propor- 
tion is higher in Canada than in the United States despite Canada’s less inclu- 
sive formal filing requirement. 
3.6.2  Responsiveness 
Making payments  of  income  security benefits  more frequent does not  in 
itself make the programs more responsive to variations in the need of  benefi- 
36. Advance payments are made to recipients whose net family income for the previous year 
was less than two-thirds of the credit’s phaseout threshold; beginning in the 1990 tax year, advance 
payments are also made for families with three or more children whose incomes are less than the 
credit’s phaseout threshold. 
37. The claimant must file a certificate (Form W-5)  with  his employer confirming that the 
claimant is eligible for the credit and has no other certificate in effect with another employer, and 
indicating whether the claimant’s spouse also has a certificate in effect. The tables used to compute 
advance payments reflect whether the worker has a spouse with a certificate. 
38. Individuals also must file if they have received a demand from Revenue Canada, Taxation, 
to file; if they have received an advance payment of child tax credit for the year; or if they disposed 
of  a capital property in the year. 
39. A person who receives advance EITC payments from an employer must file an income tax 
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ciaries. If  a household suddenly drops from an average income to little or no 
income, policies should provide support with reasonable timeliness, so as to 
avoid hardship.  For example,  making the Canadian refundable tax credits 
payable more often and in advance does nothing to improve their responsive- 
ness. Payments are still based upon the annual filing of tax returns, so that a 
household with a sudden loss of  income might wait up to fifteen months be- 
fore obtaining any relief.  The exact delay will hinge upon the timing and 
severity of the income drop and upon the unit’s  income before and after de- 
clining, relative to the phaseout threshold of the credit. Other tax-related in- 
come security benefits are also linked to the annual filing of returns and there- 
fore suffer similar deficiencies of responsiveness. 
Most  stand-alone income security programs are more responsive to the 
changing needs of beneficiaries, because they require income reporting more 
frequently than once a year. This is true of welfare systems and unemploy- 
ment insurance.4o  Demogrant programs are highly responsive in their delivery 
of net benefits; they make universal gross payments and then rely on the with- 
holding system to collect any taxes. Tax-based components of income security 
can also be somewhat responsive, based on their linkage with the withholding 
of taxes. Clearly, the personal credits in Canada and the personal exemptions 
in  the United States have their benefits delivered with  each pay  period for 
employed persons.  However, the current assessment method used  in  both 
countries does not allow a worker to catch up for benefits lost when his earn- 
ings in a pay period fall below the respective tax threshold; the worker must 
wait until the next annual tax filing to obtain a refund.4’  Advance payments of 
EITC are made through  employers,  based on special credit tables and the 
worker’s earnings in each pay period. 
One cost of making income security benefits highly responsive is the need 
for frequent income reporting. With some added complexities this can be ac- 
complished through tax-withholding devices. Most stand-alone income secu- 
rity programs achieve it by  requiring explicit periodic reports of  income or 
employment. It is interesting that the policy most closely approaching a guar- 
anteed income in Canada,  the CIS, does not require frequent reporting by 
beneficiaries. Since the program is confined to the aged, there is much less 
income variation to be monitored than there would be for a program encom- 
passing the working poor. The CIS requires only one application per year, 
with monthly benefits based on the claimant’s income for the previous calen- 
dar year. A person who has just retired or who anticipates a substantial decline 
in income from specified sources can have  benefits computed on estimated 
income for the current year. However, an unanticipated income decline that 
occurs within a year will not be reflected in higher benefits until the following 
40.  The food  stamp program  certifies  welfare households for the duration of  their welfare 
grants. Nonwelfare households are certified for three-month periods, but shorter periods can be 
used, hinging upon anticipated instability of  household income or composition. 
41. The cumulative assessment method used in Britain (‘‘Pay As  You Earn”) overcomes this 
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year. The counterpart U.S.  program, SSI, which covers the disabled as well 
as the elderly, has monthly reporting, so benefits can respond far more quickly 
to changes in income. 
3.6.3  Timing and Horizontal Equity 
Without extensive averaging provisions, departures from linearity in the tax 
or tax-transfer  rate schedule can make a person’s net taxes or benefits hinge 
on the timing of his income receipts. Two individuals with the same long-run 
average income level could face different taxes or benefits based on the timing 
of  their  incomes-a  clear violation  of  horizontal  equity.  These effects can 
arise  from the  benefit  schedule in  income security  programs,  the  tax  rate 
schedule, tax-transfer provisions, or the interaction between the tax and trans- 
fer programs. Both Canada and the United States abolished their provisions 
for general  income averaging  with  their  personal  tax  reforms of  the  latter 
1980s. The removal of  averaging was justified  as a simplification measure, 
and it was further argued that averaging was much less needed on account of 
the flattening of the tax rate schedules. Yet  this view ignores the remaining 
progressivity of the rate schedules, as well as the nonlinearities introduced by 
threshold and clawback provisions related to income security and its taxation. 
Several examples can be cited to illustrate the horizontal inequities that re- 
sult  from the threshold  and clawback provisions;  others  appear in the next 
section on effective marginal tax rates. Clawback of FA  and OAS payments 
occurs only above $50,000 of net income in a year. For two persons having 
average annual net incomes of $50,000, the one with greater year-to-year in- 
come variability will have more of  his benefits clawed back. Indeed, a person 
with perfect stability at $50,000 in every year will not face the clawback at 
all. Similarly, the half-taxability  of OASDI benefits arises only above speci- 
fied annual income thresholds. Hence, income variability around the threshold 
will raise the filer’s taxability of benefits for a given average level of income. 
The EITC benefit schedule is also nonlinear in earned income; annual benefits 
first rise with earnings, are flat over a range of earnings, and finally decline 
with higher earnings. Year-to-year earnings variability either around the level 
where the maximum EITC benefit is first attained or where the benefit phase- 
out begins will reduce a worker’s total benefits relative to someone with more 
stable  earnings. However,  earnings variability  around  the point  where  the 
EITC fully phases out ($20,264 in 1990) will increase the worker’s total ben- 
efits  .42 
These horizontal  inequities result from annual accounting periods for tax- 
transfer provisions  that parallel  the period  for personal  tax accounting.  Yet 
even within the calendar-year period, income variation can lead to the periodic 
42. The reason that income variability is actually beneficial in this case can he explained in 
economist’s jargon as follows. At the point at which the EITC fully phases out, the tax-transfer 
schedule becomes convex; all of the other examples of income variability hurting the individual 
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receipt of benefits that are deemed unwarranted on an annual basis. That is, a 
person is measured as needy in particular periods of the year, but his entire- 
year earnings would make him ineligible for benefits. This situation can arise 
under tax-transfer programs and requires the recovery of excess benefits from 
the individual. Most stand-alone income security programs avoid this problem 
by utilizing shorter accounting periods, often coinciding with the benefit pay- 
ment period. Certain tax-transfer programs,  such as the Canadian refundable 
tax credits,  largely  avoid  this problem by basing their payments on past in- 
come. Still, the introduction of advance payments of the refundable child tax 
credits  can  produce  overpayments.  Advance  payments  of  EITC  benefits 
through employers can also yield overpayments that need to be recovered with 
the annual filing of tax returns. So long as excess payments need to be recov- 
ered from households at average or higher incomes, no great difficulties arise. 
Moreover,  the intrayear income variability  that creates the excess payments 
tends to generate overwithholding of income taxes, against which the benefit 
recovery can be charged. 
Nonlinearities of the effective tax-transfer rate schedule also invite individ- 
uals to manipulate the timing of  their income receipts.  Certain types of  in- 
come can be accelerated, delayed, or bunched so as to maximize the net ben- 
efits.  The income  types  that are most open to discretion in  timing  are the 
realization  of capital gains and the withdrawal of taxable funds from RRSPs 
and IRAs.  Let us illustrate the potential  gains to a Canadian retired couple 
from bunching their RRSP withdrawals, assuming they have funds that would 
yield $13,000 annually for their life expectancies. We consider the GIS along 
with provincial supplements in British Columbia, the OAS, and income taxes. 
The couple’s first option is to receive $13,000 annually through withdrawals 
or annuity payments.  This income would disqualify  them from the GIS and 
the provincial supplement, but they would draw OAS benefits of  $8,235 per 
year at mid-1990 rates. The couple’s second option is to bunch RRSP with- 
drawals of $26,000 in alternate years. Because their non-OAS income would 
be zero every other year, they would receive the full GIS and provincial sup- 
plements totalling $7,820 in alternate years. After subtracting out the personal 
taxes payable in alternate years, their average net transfers would be over 24 
percent higher than under the uniform withdrawal strategy. 
3.7  Effective Marginal Tax Rates 
The total effective marginal tax rate facing an individual includes the ex- 
plicit marginal rate of personal  tax, the clawback or phaseout rates on any 
relevant tax transfers, and the benefit reduction rates on cash or in-kind bene- 
fits that the individual receives.43  These rates will cumulate additively unless 
43. Kesselman (1980) assesses these issues for earlier Canadian provisions. Fortin (1985) pro- 
vides an analysis of effective marginal tax rates in Canadian income security provisions and their 
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the benefits of one provision are deductible in the calculation of need, or abil- 
ity to pay, of the other provision. Most recipients of  cash or in-kind benefits 
from stand-alone income security programs are below the thresholds for per- 
sonal tax and do not face both marginal rates simultaneously. However, the 
phaseouts and clawbacks of income security delivered through the tax system 
confront large numbers  of  taxpayers who  also bear  positive rates of  tax. 
Sometimes the marginal rate implications of  these provisions are relatively 
concealed from taxpayers, so that the true effective marginal rates are not 
always obvious. We  illustrate several of  these marginal rate effects due to 
income security provisions in the personal tax system, and then we consider 
their implications for policy. 
The importance of marginal tax rates is well known in the theoretical and 
policy assessment of taxation; they are equally important for income security 
issues. Changes in rates may evoke a wide range of behavioral responses by 
taxpayers and beneficiaries. These include individuals’ labor-supply decisions 
with respect to hours of  work, exertion, labor-force participation, regularity 
of  work,  industry, occupation, education, training, mobility, responsibility, 
and joint family decisions. On  the labor-demand side, the key  choices by 
business firms include total employment, hours per week versus number of 
workers, occupational and skill composition, stability of  employment, and 
compensation including fringe benefits. Saving incentives may  also be  af- 
fected with respect to aggregate levels, composition, asset and industry allo- 
cation, owner-occupied housing, and entrepreneurial behavior. Other relevant 
incentives include income reporting, avoidance, and evasion; the timing and 
bunching of income; and family formation and instability. Many of  these ef- 
fects are the result of “imperfect” definitions of the tax or transfer unit, the tax 
or transfer base, and timing and accounting principles; but increases in effec- 
tive marginal rates aggravate the behavioral responses. 
3.7.1  Illustrative Marginal Tax Rates 
Reducing marginal tax rates was a primary goal of personal tax reform on 
both sides of the border. Yet  both countries previously had, and have retained 
or expanded, income security provisions in their tax systems that raise effec- 
tive marginal rates well above the statutory rates. The phaseout provisions in 
Canada’s refundable child and sales tax credits raise effective marginal rates 
by 5 percentage points for taxpayers with incomes in the phaseout ranges. The 
1990 thresholds for the two types of credits are $24,750 and $18,000, respec- 
tively. The conversion of  the sales tax credit to a Goods and Services Tax 
credit in  1991 lifts the threshold for phaseout to $24,000. This substantially 
increases the number of families who face both phaseouts simultaneously and 
yields a 10-percentage-point increase in their effective tax rates. Added to the 
middle tax  rate  bracket for many  taxpayers, the increase will  create total 
federal-provincial effective marginal tax rates exceeding 50 percent-at  very 
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The recently introduced clawbacks on benefits from Family Allowance and 
OAS add  15 percentage points to marginal tax rates for a range of  incomes 
above the $50,000 threshold. However, since the clawed-back amounts are 
tax-deductible, the net increase in effective marginal rates ranges from about 
7 to 9 percentage points (depending upon the taxpayer’s province and income 
bracket). These increases are added to the rates of the middle and top marginal 
tax brackets, yielding in some cases total federal-provincial effective marginal 
rates approaching 60 percent.  The clawback  on  UI  benefits, with  a  1990 
threshold just below $50,000, is applied at 30 percent, so the impact on effec- 
tive marginal rates is twice that of the other clawbacks. 
The conversion of personal exemptions into nonrefundable credits as part 
of the Canadian tax reforms did have the incidental effect of reducing effective 
marginal tax rates for a range of  income of  dependent spouses. In claiming 
the marital exemption, an initial amount (about $500) of income of the depen- 
dent spouse could be ignored, and additional income reduced the net exemp- 
tion dollar-for-dollar. Hence, a dependent spouse faced an  initial 0 percent 
marginal tax rate, followed by  an effective marginal rate equal to that of the 
spouse (often the relatively high rate of  a full-time worker), and finally the 
bottom bracket rate at income above the basic personal exemption; at this 
point the spouse filed separately. With personal credits in place of exemptions, 
a similar arrangement has been retained, namely a small disregard followed 
by dollar-for-dollar offset of the exemption-equivalent amount of  the credit. 
Since the credits are exemptions evaluated at the bottom bracket tax rate, a 
dependent spouse with modest income now faces the bottom rate rather than 
the primary-earner spouse’s marginal tax rate. 
When the United States reformed its personal tax, it chose to claw back 
from higher-income taxpayers the benefits of the 15 percent rate bracket and 
of the personal exemptions. This is done by a 5 percent surcharge for incomes 
above specified levels, depending upon the type of filer, creating an effective 
33 percent marginal rate bracket within the 28 percent nominal rate bracket. 
Benefits of the bottom bracket are clawed back first and are entirely eliminated 
at 1990 incomes of $97,620 for single filers and $162,770 for joint married 
filers. Above those incomes the personal exemptions are clawed back at a rate 
of  5 percent. The income range for clawing back the benefits of each $2,050 
personal exemption in  1990 is $11,480 (the benefit for the 28  percent rate 
bracket is 0.28  X  $2,050 = $574). Thus the clawback of  personal exemp- 
tions arises only at very high income levels. 
Two other income security features of the U.S. personal tax also raise effec- 
tive marginal rates. Benefits of the EITC are phased out at a rate of  10 percent 
for 1990 incomes between $10,730 and $20,264. Many American families in 
this income range are taxable, and if  they qualify for EITC their effective 
marginal tax rate is 25 percent rather than the nominal marginal rate of  15 
percent. Up to half of  OASDI or Social Security cash benefits must be in- 
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married joint filers with incomes above $32,000. This provision operates in 
such a way  as to raise effective marginal tax rates of affected persons by  50 
percent of  their statutory rates. Most affected persons are in the 28 percent 
federal tax bracket, so that their effective marginal tax rates jump to 42 per- 
cent. Clearly, the addition of  income taxes in some states could carry their 
total effective marginal tax rates above 50 percent. 
3.7.2  Policy Issues and Analysis 
The notches and poverty  traps created by  high effective marginal rates, 
which approach and sometimes exceed 100 percent, are familiar for stand- 
alone income security programs (see Hausman 1975; Fortin 1985). These re- 
sult from prohibitions on full-time work for UI beneficiaries, earnings tests 
for OASDI, and income tests of up to 100 percent for beneficiaries of welfare, 
GIS (with provincial supplements), and SSI. Income tests on in-kind benefits 
add directly to the effective marginal tax rates when the programs are not 
coordinated. The marginal rate effects of income security provisions in the tax 
system are less severe but also much less recognized. Since these can affect 
large numbers of  people, and those affected have far more earnings than the 
poor, the potential distortions of economic behavior may be even more impor- 
tant. The use and structuring of such tax provisions raise fundamental issues 
of  policy relating to economic efficiency, vertical equity, and tax administra- 
tion and compliance. 
Clawbacks and phaseouts of income security or tax-based benefits are com- 
monly motivated by  the perception that it is “wasteful” for benefits to go to 
the nonpoor or the well-off. This view cites the poor targeting of public funds, 
or tax expenditures, for income security objectives. Yet  it ignores the eco- 
nomic costs of the clawbacks and phaseouts themselves. These are the eco- 
nomic inefficiencies and behavioral distortions caused by  the provisions’ in- 
creased  effective  marginal  tax  rates,  along  with  their  administrative  and 
compliance costs. One policy alternative is to have less of such income-testing 
in the tax system and to raise more gross revenues to finance the more costly 
but more widely dispersed benefits. That is, one can either raise the marginal 
effective rates  on  beneficiaries  alone  (perhaps  within  particular  income 
ranges), or one can raise marginal tax rates to a smaller degree for all or most 
taxpayers. This is a complex choice based upon various trade-offs between 
efficiency  and equity, as well as the administrative and operational aspects. 
Optimal tax theory provides general guidance in the decision whether to 
use clawbacks and phaseouts and, if they are adopted, in the choice of how to 
structure them.44  The efficiency cost of raising the effective marginal tax rate 
in a particular range of income hinges upon the initial marginal tax rate in that 
income range, how many individuals fall in that range, their total income or 
44. For general theory, see Mirrlees (1971) and Atkinson (1982);  applications of the theory to 
a two-bracket rate schedule relevant to design of the tax-transfer system are in Kesselman and 
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earnings within the range, and the responsiveness of  their work effort or tax 
avoidance activities to higher marginal rates. The efficiency costs rise more 
than proportionately with  increases in the marginal rate, so that one would 
usually not want to impose clawbacks or phaseouts on top of  high rates of 
income testing in other income security programs. Nevertheless, in some cir- 
cumstances it may be economically efficient to have very high effective mar- 
ginal rates, even rates above 100 percent with so-called notches, as a way of 
concentrating the  inefficiencies at  lower  incomes (see Blinder and  Rosen 
1985). Since aggregate earnings at those levels are relatively small, this ap- 
proach can sometimes serve to minimize the total efficiency costs. This anal- 
ysis may help to explain the existence of poverty traps in the policies of many 
countries. 
More typically, it is efficient to avoid extremely high marginal rates. In- 
come thresholds in tax-based phaseouts are a way to avoid compounding the 
already high effective marginal rates faced by beneficiaries of  stand-alone in- 
come security programs. For similar reasons of  efficiency cost, one would 
usually not want to impose high rates of clawback or phaseout on top of high 
personal marginal tax rates. This suggests that the income thresholds used for 
such devices be set sufficiently low that the targeted benefits are fully phased 
out at income levels below those attracting high personal marginal tax rates. 
Of course, the efficiency goal has to be balanced against the desired distribu- 
tion of  net benefits. A broader view of  the policy problem is that the high 
marginal rates and notches in the separate income security programs need to 
be assessed and perhaps modified. For reasons of efficiency as well as admin- 
istration, it may be desirable to undertake such reforms in  a way  that more 
closely integrates income security programs and personal taxation. 
The flattening of rate schedules with recent tax reforms in both countries 
suggests that it is now less costly in efficiency terms to apply phaseouts across 
wide income ranges, including higher incomes. Still, the efficiency costs of 
providing most income security for employable persons through such income- 
tested or clawed-back provisions may be excessive. Theoretical and quantita- 
tive analyses have found strong efficiency advantages to using alternative pol- 
icy tools. First, personal “tags” such as disability, old age, and perhaps pres- 
ence of preschool children can be used to categorize potential beneficiaries as 
nonemployable (see Akerlof 1978). Higher income-tested benefit rates can be 
restricted to those who cannot work and those deemed as not expected to 
work. By  reducing the total budgetary costs of universal support programs, 
this approach can relieve the pressures for higher marginal rates on taxpayers. 
Second, persons deemed  employable can be  assisted through  a variety  of 
work-related programs, including wage and employment subsidies or  similar 
provisions delivered through the tax system.45  These programs carry far less 
45. For elaborations of this  categorical approach and of the possible role of  government as 
employer-of-last-resort,  see Kesselman (1973, 1985), Mendelson (1986), and Ellwood (1988). 138  Jonathan R. Kesselman 
efficiency cost than general income support programs for employable persons, 
since they  sharply reduce the  effective marginal tax rates on beneficiaries’ 
work (Kesselman 1976; Ballard 1988). 
3.7.3  Application in Canada and the United States 
In Canada, the policy debate has centered on the universal demogrants and 
public health insurance.46 Universality  has been attacked as wasteful, costly, 
and “inefficient” in its targeting. First the demogrants were made taxable, and 
more recently they have been subjected to clawbacks up to 100 percent.  Sev- 
eral  provinces  allowed  “extra-billing”  for physician  services  and  deterrent 
charges  for hospital  admissions,  but  the  federal  government  has  thwarted 
these practices through  its control over cost-sharing.  Similar moves can be 
seen in the United States. The legislated but never-implemented  Medicare tax 
(a federal surtax on the income of seniors) is one example. Many other pro- 
posals for greater taxability or clawbacks of income security benefits can be 
found in the Congressional Budget Office’s annual report, Reducing the Dej- 
cit: Spending and Revenue Options. Examples from the  1989 report include: 
taxing a portion of Medicare benefits; reducing the subsidy for nonpoor chil- 
dren in child nutrition programs; counting energy assistance as income under 
AFDC, SSI, and food stamps; phasing out the child care credit at higher in- 
comes;  taxing the income-replacement  part of  workers’ compensation;  and 
increasing the taxation of OASDI benefits. 
All of  these policy initiatives and proposals are motivated by the goal of 
reducing expenditures, recovering part of payments, or improving the target- 
ing of benefits. An underlying objective is to reduce the budgetary deficit or 
to avoid the need to raise tax rates. Yet  all these forms of benefit clawback or 
income testing act very  much like an increased tax on the affected persons. 
Hence,  they  invoke the  efficiency and equity  issues that  have already been 
discussed.  Moreover, the notion that benefits of  these spending and tax ex- 
penditure provisions are not sufficiently targeted on the neediest ignores the 
fact that they are financed out of general revenues. Even if the tax system were 
strictly proportional,  the payment of universal demogrants or the provision of 
universal health insurance would be significantly redistributive. And the effi- 
ciency costs of such programs may also be minimal, aside from the distortions 
of the taxes needed to finance them. For example, the OAS demogrants paid 
to all elderly Canadians  may  simply substitute for savings accumulated for 
retirement purposes.47 Even using coinsurance or deterrent fees for publicly 
insured health  services may provide little effective rationing of demand, and 
the economic efficiency of these devices is open to question. 
46. For analysis of the demogrant issues, see Kesselman (1980) and Mendelson (1981). 
47.  Nevertheless,  there  may  be  efficiency gains to recapturing  OAS benefits from higher- 
income recipients on account of  the distortions of the taxes needed to finance them. That is, it may 
be efficient to raise the effective tax rates on the elderly through the OAS clawback so as to reduce 
the tax rates needed for the general taxpaying population, because the labor-supply responses of 
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3.8  Program Complexity and Simplification 
It  might be deemed acceptable to  have very complex taxation provisions 
affecting primarily  businesses and high-income households. Those groups 
either possess the requisite knowledge or can afford to hire professional ad- 
vice. Comparable complexity is hardly tolerable for the tax and transfer pro- 
visions affecting millions of  people at lower incomes, who typically are far 
less sophisticated in their facility with tax laws, bureaucratic procedures, and 
paperwork. If the overall tax-transfer system in Canada or the United States is 
challenging for educated analysts to comprehend, as our study suggests, it 
must be hopelessly complex for the actual and potential beneficiaries. There 
may be  some legitimate policy objectives justifying limited complications. 
Examples might include social insurance principles, specific in-kind benefits, 
work-related benefits, or attempts to refine horizontal equity for persons with 
differing circumstances. Yet  it would be hard to justify many elements of the 
existing systems or the systems in their entirety. 
Undue complexity in transfer programs and tax provisions for income se- 
curity can  undermine  their  effectiveness. Among  the  possible  results  are 
incomplete take-up by eligible persons, horizontal inequities, errors in com- 
puting benefits or taxes due, and uncertainty by  beneficiaries about the con- 
sequences of  various actions on their benefits. The last effect may raise or 
reduce the disincentives for work and savings behavior relative to a clearer 
system, but it can hardly be viewed as desirable. Incomplete take-up can be 
found for both in-kind and tax-transfer programs. About one-fourth of AFDC 
households do not apply for food stamps, “for unknown reasons,” even though 
virtually all such families are eligible. Significant numbers of elderly Canadi- 
ans who are eligible for at least partial CIS payments fail to apply for them. 
Take-up is also less than complete for refundable credits, which require an- 
nual filing of  tax returns by  nontaxable claimants. In contrast, take-up rates 
are virtually 100  percent for the Canadian demogrant programs, which require 
just a single registration. 
3.8.1  Program Examples 
Much complexity arises from the structural features of  individual tax or 
transfer provisions, interactions between provisions, or duplication of func- 
tion by  multiple provisions. The Canadian tax and transfer treatment of de- 
pendent children provides a striking example of  unwarranted program com- 
plexity. The system contains nonrefundable credits, two distinct refundable 
credits, and demogrants that are both taxable and subject to clawback. The 
resulting pattern of  net benefits per child as a function of  family income is 
hard to justify. Yet  the pattern is less haphazard than it was prior to the replace- 
ment  of  child exemptions with nonrefundable credits. At  that time the net 
benefits rose with income because the exemptions were of no value to nontax- 
able units; they reached a peak at family incomes near the threshold for phase- 140  Jonathan R. Kesselman 
out  of  the  refundable  child  credits,  which  between  1982 and  1985  was 
$26,330. Hence, the fiscal benefits for a child were larger for nonpoor taxpay- 
ers than for poor, nontaxable households. Yet the shift to nonrefundable cred- 
its has only partially remedied the pattern,  and it has left the multiplicity  of 
provisions. 
The Canadian  provisions  for  children  could  be  simplified  in  ways  that 
would  simultaneously  rationalize  and coordinate them.  In  1990 the Family 
Allowance payment is $400 per child; the exemption-equivalent  value of the 
nonrefundable child credit is $399 for each of the first two children in a family. 
The FA  could  be made nontaxable  and  the  nonrefundable  credits  simulta- 
neously abolished. A revision of the threshold for clawback of FA could offset 
the lost taxability of FA at middle incomes. In  1991, the threshold for phase- 
out of refundable credits for the federal sales tax was raised to $24,800 (from 
its  1990 level of $18,000),  almost identical to the phaseout threshold for re- 
fundable child tax credits. There is now no reason for keeping the two refund- 
able credits distinct. The two could be consolidated into a single credit, with 
the credit amount per child equal to the sum of the child amounts under the 
two existing credits. A more sweeping reform could be instituted that would 
roll all of the child-related provisions into a single child benefit. Perhaps the 
best approach  would be universal child demogrants  subject to partial claw- 
back based on family income and beginning at a modest threshold, such as the 
poverty threshold for the relevant family size. As far as feasible, it would be 
desirable to integrate this clawback into source withholding of taxes. 
The United States has fewer overlaps between tax and transfer systems pre- 
cisely because it has been less venturesome than Canada on tax-based trans- 
fers to the working poor.  But food stamps, housing subsidies, and other in- 
kind and cash transfers do provide many interactions and complexities. Some 
of these programs count receipts or entitlements from other programs in their 
computation of benefits. This policy can reduce the problem of high effective 
marginal rates due to the stacking of benefit-reduction  rates from individual 
programs,  but it also complicates  program administration and enforcement. 
Moreover,  entitlement  to benefits  under some programs,  such as Medicaid, 
may hinge upon eligibility for welfare. The only real tax-based transfer in the 
United  States, the earned-income  tax credit, has a relatively  simple benefit 
structure because  it uses standard tax definitions  of earned income and ad- 
justed  gross income in computing benefits. Personal exemptions for depen- 
dent children are phased out at very high incomes through a 5 percent surtax, 
which tax expert Joseph Pechman characterized as “bizarre”  and “an anach- 
ronism that should not be allowed to survive” (1987, p. 22). 
In  addition  to  the  structural  complexity  illustrated  in  the  preceding  ex- 
amples, many low-income taxpayers and transfer recipients face serious bar- 
riers in simply interpreting their eligibility for particular benefits.  Such com- 
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particularly those in which there is scope for administrative discretion. These 
problems are also found in such commonly used American tax provisions as 
the dependency exemptions, marital and filing status, the earned-income tax 
credit, the child care credit, the kiddie tax, and child support payments. For 
example, an individual’s eligibility to claim a tax exemption for a dependent 
person hinges upon the dependent’s relation to the taxpayer, levels of support 
to the dependent from the taxpayer and from others, and the dependent’s in- 
come, place of  abode, and citizenship or country of residence. For most of 
these provisions, the qualifying rules could be radically simplified with only 
minor cost in terms of reduced horizontal equity, potential for abuse, or reve- 
nue loss (see suggestions by  Schenk 1989). Several Canadian tax provisions 
affecting low-income taxpayers have similar, often needless complexity  in 
their qualifying conditions. Examples include nonrefundable credits for de- 
pendents, deductions for child care expenses, and the tax treatment of  ali- 
mony and maintenance payments. 
3.8.2  Guidelines for Simplification 
It is difficult to formulate general principles to guide the simplification of 
income security, precisely because of the multifaceted objectives of these pro- 
visions. In part,  complexity is the result of  the heterogeneity of  the needy 
population-the  elderly,  single-parent families,  the  disabled,  the  hard-to- 
employ, and the unemployed. Associated with these various groups is a diver- 
sity of  concerns regarding work incentives, training, in-kind provision, an 
income floor, and accustomed living standards. Clearly, the simplest scheme 
would be a set of demogrants, which would be undifferentiated or based on 
just a few easily observed characteristics, such as age. Yet  this scheme would 
not satisfy all of the objectives of income security, and its budgetary cost and 
attendant marginal tax rates would most likely be prohibitive. Some form of 
categorization, distinguishing between those who are employable and those 
who are not, would likely be needed for an acceptable demogrant scheme. 
And the dictates of horizontal equity mean that tax provisions for child care 
and large medical expenses will not readily be abandoned. 
Despite the hazards, let us suggest a few guidelines to be considered in any 
simplification exercise. The basic definitions used to operate the separate in- 
come transfer programs, including in-kind benefits, should be aligned more 
closely with the definitions of the personal income tax. That is, the unit, the 
base, and some of the accounting principles should be better coordinated. The 
creation of a consistent unit for taxes and transfers will require more changes 
for Canada than for the United States. Coordinated timing will be difficult to 
achieve, given the annual accounting period for taxation and the shorter peri- 
ods used for most transfer and social insurance programs. However, the ad- 
ministration and enforcement of income taxes would be aided by the reporting 
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riods of time; reporting  of these items would also be required for improved 
income support devices, including work-related  schemes. One can consider 
which party should be responsible for supplying information needed to oper- 
ate a program. If this information is relatively complex, the onus should first 
be on the tax or transfer administrators, then on employers and other payers, 
and only last on the beneficiaries. The qualifying conditions for income secu- 
rity programs  and tax provisions  should also be simplified in ways that are 
consistent with other policy objectives. 
3.9  The Future of the Tax-Tkansfer System 
While reforms to tax provisions for income security have been extensive in 
Canada and the United States over the past five years, the overall tax-transfer 
systems have not been fundamentally  altered. Both countries had previously 
instituted forms of guaranteed income for their elderly populations.  Canada 
placed a floor under the incomes of the aged through the OAS, CIS, and pro- 
vincial supplements, and the United States operated through SSI, state supple- 
ments, and the minimum-benefit provision of Social Security. Similarly, both 
countries  provided  limited, if  inadequate, forms of  minimum  incomes  for 
their disabled:  Canada through  Social Assistance  and CPP, and the  United 
States through SSI and welfare.  Almost all of these earlier policies were en- 
acted outside of the personal income tax. Several changes in tax-based provi- 
sions for the aged and disabled have been instituted recently. Both countries 
have attempted  to improve the targeting  of  lower-income  persons.  Canada 
converted deductions for private pension income, aged status, and disability 
into nonrefundable tax credits, while the United States converted its age and 
disability exemptions into additional deductions restricted to those claiming 
the standard deduction. Yet  the two countries have moved in opposite direc- 
tions in their provisions for tax sheltering of retirement savings. Canada has 
expanded and rationalized access to these provisions at the same time that the 
United States has restricted access. 
A  more vital question is how  the countries  have dealt with the nonaged 
employable poor and their dependent children. Recent tax innovations in this 
area have been more numerous in Canada than in the United States. A major 
and largely successful reform goal for both countries was to reduce income 
taxation of the poor. Canada has been more generous than the United States in 
setting its thresholds for taxability,  particularly  when refundable credits and 
demogrant payments are considered as offsets to personal tax. But both coun- 
tries still impose income taxes on many poor, nonaged single persons and on 
smaller proportions of other groups. In the last several years, Canada has re- 
duced the extent of tax indexation for inflation,  while the United States has 
implemented full indexation of its key tax components. The reforms have also 
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converted personal exemptions and several other deductible items into nonre- 
fundable credits, expanded the scope and generosity of its refundable credits, 
and introduced a tax clawback at upper-middle incomes on its demogrant pay- 
ment~.~~  The United States has made less extensive changes to augment tar- 
geting: increasing standard deductions and limiting itemized deductions, fully 
taxing jobless benefits, and clawing back personal exemptions at very high 
incomes. The earned-income tax credit has been fully indexed but not other- 
wise enriched. 
The income security “system” for each country has evolved by  piecemeal 
additions of  new programs and tax provisions and by  extensions of  existing 
features aimed at improving coverage, scope, or adequacy. It has proven more 
difficult  to remove or rationalize programs and provisions. Even when reforms 
are justifiable on horizontal-equity or incentive grounds, they create losers 
unless funds are added to the system. This pattern of evolution has yielded an 
accretion of programs and provisions, unanticipated interactions, and cumu- 
lative complexity. But the hope that these incremental changes are leading 
toward a streamlined, radically improved system appears elusive. Refundable 
child tax credits were heralded at their introduction in Canada in 1979 as the 
basis for a guaranteed income.  Again,  in  1987, newly  enacted refundable 
sales tax credits were touted as a building block toward a guaranteed income. 
Similar hopes accompanied the 1964 enactment of  food stamps and the later 
provision of earned-income tax credits, in the United States. Yet  none of these 
provisions offers a promising basis for a broader guaranteed income, even if 
they have added to the total support for the low-income population. 
3.9.1  The Guaranteed-Income Approach 
Existing tax provisions do not lead toward a comprehensive income support 
scheme because of their poor responsiveness to changes in individual needs. 
In concept, this deficiency could be remedied through frequent periodic in- 
come reporting by  beneficiaries and corresponding adjustment of their bene- 
fits. But this would entail major administrative resources and would not be 
easily accommodated within the personal tax system. Another major limita- 
tion of the move toward a comprehensive income support scheme for employ- 
able nonaged persons and their children is the problem of tax-back rates, in- 
centives, and budgetary cost. Consolidation of all existing support programs 
and provision of an adequate level of guaranteed income, with few or no los- 
ers, would carry unacceptable budgetary costs or excessive marginal tax rates. 
A proposal for a guaranteed income integrated with the personal income tax, 
detailed in  1985 by  a Canadian Royal Commission, displayed all of  these 
difficulties.  In  order  to  provide adequate guarantee levels with  reasonable 
48. Part of  the expansion of refundable tax credits has been simply to offset the  incidence of 
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work incentives  for beneficiaries,  effective marginal tax rates had to rise to 
49-65  percent for middle-income earners.49  Severe disincentives to work and 
compliance facing the poor under welfare would simply be shifted to the much 
larger bulk of the taxpaying population. 
Recent reforms of  personal taxation will further constrain Canada and the 
United States from pursuing the guaranteed-income or negative-tax  approach 
to reforming income security. Tax reform was motivated largely by a desire to 
reduce the marginal rates of tax while broadening the taxable base. Adoption 
of  a guaranteed income would substantially raise effective marginal tax rates 
over a wide range of middle-income taxpayers. These tax rates are still rather 
high at middle and upper incomes in Canada. Indeed, the use of a variety of 
clawback provisions and benefit phaseouts  in the income tax makes the Ca- 
nadian effective marginal rate schedule both erratic and higher than the nomi- 
nal rate schedule. Clawbacks and phaseouts  apply above thresholds ranging 
from $18,000 to $50,000 for Family  Allowance,  Old Age Security,  unem- 
ployment insurance benefits, and refundable tax credits. These increments to 
marginal rates are particularly  inefficient because they arise at dense parts of 
the  income distribution. In  contrast, the higher  marginal  rates  applied  for 
guaranteed-income benefits to the elderly and disabled pose lesser inefficien- 
cies because they apply to groups with much lower earnings capacity. A simi- 
lar observation applies to the U.S.  method of partially taxing Social Security 
cash benefits, which raises federal marginal tax rates by half across a range of 
middle incomes. 
3.9.2  Work-Related Subsidy and Employability Approach 
The primary policy alternative for income security with ressct to employ- 
able nonaged  adults  is to expand the use of  work-related  subsidies.  These 
subsidies can be delivered through the personal tax system, as with the EITC; 
through the employer, as with employment subsidies or tax credits; or directly 
to the worker, as with wage-rate subsidies.  All forms improve incentives by 
effectively  subsidizing work, but wage subsidies may  be preferred  for their 
superior targeting by beneficiary earnings capacity and their greater work in- 
centives. The extent to which a greater emphasis on work-related support will 
require categorization of persons who are employable and those who are not 
remains to be seen. Still, relatively generous provision of benefits for those 
unable  to work  will  strengthen  the economic case for categorization.  This 
overall strategy may also involve the provision of public employment at rela- 
tively low wages as a last resort for those unable to find private work. Reforms 
49. For the proposal,  see Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Pros- 
pects for Canada (1985); for a critique see Kesselman (1986). Leman (1980) provides a historical 
account and policy analysis of the failure of earlier proposals for guaranteed incomes in Canada 
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to UI to improve incentives for reemployment and more stable jobs, particu- 
larly in Canada, have an obvious role. Both countries have already made lim- 
ited moves toward a work-related approach through policies for employment 
tax credits, wage and training subsidies,  work requirements in welfare,  and 
earnings subsidies or tax credits.50 
Reinforcing the work-related  subsidies for employable adults would be a 
wide range of policies to improve the market earnings capacity of low-skilled, 
poorly  educated  workers,  and to help their children avoid similar problems 
when they enter the labor market. This approach to income security reflects 
an increased emphasis  on attacking the causes of poverty  and low incomes 
and a reduced emphasis on alleviating the symptoms. Suitable policies might 
include  improvements  in  the  following  areas:  institutional  and  on-the-job 
training, apprenticeship programs, public education, adult literacy, day care, 
employment counseling, special public employment, enforcement of support 
payments, and employment or pay equity. Many policies have been tried pre- 
viously in these areas; the present challenge is to improve their content and 
delivery, as well as to find an effective mix of policies. This is an ambitious 
agenda, and the trade-offs with conventional income support will be difficult. 
Moreover, these policies have long gestation periods before producing results 
that ultimately reduce the ongoing costs of providing income security. 
Supporting children  in lower-income households is another important as- 
pect of income security. Receipt of benefits is tied directly to the presence of 
children under some provisions (welfare in both countries and the EITC in the 
United States). Welfare receipt is conditional upon nonemployment in most 
instances, whereas EITC benefits are tied to earned income. It may be fairer, 
and simpler, to provide child benefits unrelated to the work-force attachment 
of the parent,  as with Family Allowance  and refundable child tax credits in 
Canada. Any earnings- or work-related subsidies or tax credits would then be 
provided  to adults irrespective of  the  presence of  dependent children.  The 
child benefits could be  income tested,  either prior to payment  or through a 
clawback device in the income tax. However, it would make sense to target 
the net benefits on families at low incomes, so that the clawback rates do not 
affect middle- or upper-income  earners. The existing clawbacks on Family 
Allowance in Canada and on child tax exemptions in the United States affect 
taxpayers at middle and upper incomes, respectively. With a partial clawback, 
child demogrants could also serve to differentiate net tax burdens by family 
size at higher incomes in a simple and nondistorting  fashion. Whether one 
chooses to provide such differentiation  hinges on value judgments, as noted 
earlier in the study. 
50. Both countries have delivered tax credits through the employing firm. Canada began an 
employment tax credit in 1978. The U.S.  instituted the New Jobs Tax Credit program in  1977 and 
converted it to the Targeted Jobs Credit in 1979; these provisions were predated by a “work incen- 
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3.9.3 
Recent reforms  in  Canada  and  the United  States reveal  a willingness  to 
experiment with tax-based provisions for income security. The extent to which 
future income security functions are embedded in the tax system, as opposed 
to  spending programs, will  hinge  upon  a host  of  practical  considerations. 
These include the administrative needs of responsiveness, frequency of  pay- 
ments, the relation between the tax and transfer unit, the relation between the 
measure of need and the taxable base, publicity costs and take-up rates, and 
social factors such as the stigma for beneficiaries.  Insofar as the policies are 
structurally  tied  to training  or employment,  it  is  harder  to operate  them 
through the income tax, with the exception of an earnings tax credit. Regard- 
less of their exact content, future reforms  should ignore the distinction be- 
tween  direct  expenditures  and  tax  expenditures.  Choices  between  a  tax 
method and a spending approach should consider only the net revenue costs, 
vertical incidence, horizontal equity, efficiency costs, incentives, and the de- 
livery aspects cited here (see Kesselman 1990a). It is notable that most recent 
proposals for reforming income security in both countries, ranging across the 
ideological spectrum, include tax-based provisions  .51 
Early in this study the main external constraint on the development of  the 
two countries’ income security was identified as industry-specific issues. Mi- 
gration of labor between Canada and the United States was dismissed as un- 
likely to constrain the levels or structures of each country’s income security 
system, at least as long as steep barriers to immigration remain for most pop- 
ulation groups.  Yet  one could turn the problem  around and ask whether the 
desire for a distinct structure or level of income security in a country such as 
Canada  might  inhibit the  acceptance  of reduced  barriers to labor mobility. 
This would in fact seem to be a realistic proposition.  It is hard to imagine 
Canada, with its universal medical coverage, opening its doors to all Ameri- 
can workers. With totally open borders each individual could shop to find the 
country that maximized his or her income security benefits net of tax burden. 
Then each country, and particularly Canada as the smaller one, would be se- 
verely limited in its ability to pursue independent policies of income security 
or redistribution.  If  Canada  and the United  States wished  to integrate their 
labor markets while still preserving redistributive functions, new institutional 
arrangements would be required.52  One approach would be a mutually agreed 
and coordinated-and  perhaps jointly operated-set  of income security poli- 
cies. In other words, the two countries would have to pursue income security 
policies on a harmonized basis. 
While current pressures  for harmonizing  the  Canadian and  U.S.  income 
Future Policy Structure and Harmonization 
51. For Canadian examples, see Courchene (l987),  Kesselman (1985). and Mendelson (1986); 
52. These issues are discussed in the context of European integration by Sinn (1990). Also see 
for U.S.  examples see Ellwood (1988), Glazer (1988). and Haveman (1988). 
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security  systems  are  mostly  limited  to  industry-specific policies,  some 
broader economic forces may also be operative. These pressures do not stem 
so much from the other country as from the rest of the world and from domes- 
tic  sources.  Both  countries face  increasingly severe competitive pressures 
from overseas producers.53  And both countries face large, continuing budget- 
ary deficits at their federal levels. These considerations and the desire for 
higher real living standards may incline both countries to devise income se- 
curity policies that are efficient and promote productivity. They will intensify 
recent interest in reorienting welfare programs toward work and enhanced em- 
pl~yability.~~  They may also lead Canada away from universal programs such 
as demogrants and health insurance, though such a move would be based on 
the misconception that universality is inherently inefficient. A wide range of 
educational,  training,  child  care,  and  other  work-enhancing  policies  will 
likely play  significant roles  in  a productivity-oriented approach.  The two 
countries will undoubtedly retain major differences in the institutional mani- 
festations of their income security and related tax policies. Yet  one might an- 
ticipate  a  longer-run  convergence of  Canadian  and  U.S. policies  toward 
greater efficiency and productivity. One can hope that the policies, with some 
care in their design and with adequate political support, will also serve well 
those in need. 
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